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Who Asked You?: The Appropriateness
of U.S. Leadership in Promoting
Religious Freedom Worldwide
ABSTRACT

Government endorsed and government imposed religious
persecution is a growing phenomenon worldwide. From
Central America to the Far East, people are arrested,
tortured, and even killed for having and expressing their
faith, despite the existence of universal covenants expressing
acceptance of religious differences as among the most basic
of human rights. Seeing the apparentfutility of U.N. and
other internationalefforts to curb such persecution, the U.S.
Congress in 1998 passed the International Religious
Freedom Act. Faith-based religious persecution-and the
United States' role in combating it-first took center stage in
American politics during the IRFA's passage, and most
recently has surfaced again in the debates surrounding
China's admittance to the World Trade Organization.
This Note examines the InternationalReligious Freedom
Act: its premises, language, function, and goals. It explains
the role and actions of the newly-formed Commission on
International Religious Freedom, the attempts by the U.S.
Administration to explore diplomatic remedies for those
sufferingfrom religiouspersecution internationally,and what
the U.S. must-and must not-do in its enforcement of the
IRFA to best advocate the cause of religiousfreedom.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The twentieth century has seen twenty-seven million martyrs,
men and women who have died for their religious faith.1
In
contrast, the first nineteen centuries of the Christianera have seen
a total of fourteen million.2 An estimated two hundred million
religious believers live under persecution and an additionalfour
3
hundred million live under official discriminationtoday.
The following is a true account, not one that is ripped from
the byline of the latest blockbuster film but instead experienced
in the real world. Suffering has a face;4 indeed, it has both a real
face and a real story.
Throughout his initial fifteen-year incarceration, Catholic
Bishop Su Zhimin was subjected to grievous tortures at the

1.
Christy Cutbill McCormick, Exporting the First Amendment: America's
Response to Religious PersecutionAbroad, 4 J. INTL LEGAL STUD. 283, 333 (1998).
2.
Id. (citing James D. Davis, 'Human Tragedy" Millions Gather Today to
Engage in the Second InternationalDay of Prayerfor the Persecuted Church, FORT
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1997, at 1A).
3.
Id.
4.
Dr. Robert Seiple, Address at the Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom (Sept. 9, 1999).
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hands of Chinese authorities. 5 His captors often beat him with
boards and doors until the wood was reduced to splinters from
the force of the beatings.6 They hung him by his wrists and
repeatedly beat him around the head. 7 They placed him in a cell,
filled with water up to his hips, and left him there for days unable
to sit or rest.8 What had he done to deserve such punishment?
Was the Bishop a hardened serial murderer or a master thief?
No, his crime was simply his refusal to stop sharing his Christian
faith with others.
The Bishop's captors initially released him in 1993, but have
9
since rearrested him on several occasions for the same reason.
Bishop Su Zhemin, now age 67, has been missing since October
8, 1997, the date of his last arrest.' 0 The Chinese Government
persistently denies any knowledge of his whereabouts."
This bishop is not the only one who suffers. Current reports
from secular organizations such as Amnesty International and
the United Nations lend support to the truth of these accounts.
Amnesty revealed that among the common forms of governmentendorsed or government-imposed religious persecution in China
is the beating and torture of Christian women by authorities who
deny them food and water, hang them by their thumbs from wires
where they are beaten with heavy rods, and allow government
leaders to shock them with electric probes. 12 According to the
Human Rights Watch 1998 World Report, some eighty members
of the underground church near Linchuan, Jiangxi Province were
detained in December of 1996, where they were beaten and fined
by the police simply because the group had plans to hold a large
outdoor Christmas mass. 13 The expressed goal of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) officials involved in this effort in Jiangxi

5.
Christian Freedom International, Free the Bishops, at http://
www.christianfreedom.org/campaigns/camp-bishops.asp (last visited Feb. 26,
2000).
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. Additional information concerning Bishop Su Zhimin and other
religious colleagues undergoing persecution for standing up for their faith in
China can be found at the Christian Freedom International website at
http://www.christianfreedom.org.
12.
For these and additional Amnesty International statistics, see Mona
Charen, Christians Suffer Silently for the Faith, THE DET. NEWS, Dec. 14, 1995,
LEXIS, US News, Combined.
13.
Human Rights Watch
World Report
1998,
available at
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Asia-04.htm#P337_94962 (last modified Mar.
16, 1999). Current web versions of the 2000 Human Rights Watch can be found
at http://www.hrw.org.
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was to register these believers and force them to write letters
14
denying their faith.
Once church members are arrested in these situations,
5
They
authorities often confiscate some or all of their property.'
take parents away from their children and instill so much fear of
arrest into family and friends that those who would otherwise
help the abandoned families of these "enemies of the state" are
While this injustice undeniably
effectively unable to do so. 16
happens, China officially denies that it restricts religious freedom.
When asked, the Chinese government points to a constitution
which purports to guarantee a certain level of religious freedom
for its citizens. 1 7 Revealing evidence like the accounts above,
however, suggests otherwise.
China is home to as many as fifty to one hundred million
Christian believers, all but a fraction of whom are hidden from
8
that
official eyes in an unregistered house church movement'
19
secretly
meet
They
exists.
even
the Chinese government denies
in places like private homes, caves, and abandoned buildings for
worship and prayer. If caught, they face arrest, torture, or years
of forced labor. According to internal documents, the Chinese

Id.
14.
Christian Freedom International, Persecuted Christians in the People's
15.
Republic of China, at http://www.christianfreedom.org/campaigns/campchina.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2000).
Id.
16.
17.
Mickey Spiegel, Religion in China: Regulating the Opium of the People,
China Rights Forum Spring 1995, at http://www.igc.apc.org/hric/crf/english/
95spring/e7.html (citing Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution: "Citizens of the
No state organ,
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief ....
public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to
believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in,
or do not believe in, any religion.") Id. But as Spiegel notes, a second clause
severely limits state protection to "normal religious activities" and prohibits "the
use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt social order, impair the health of
citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state." Id. It is easy to see
how entirely subjective and undefined criterion could be used by this State to
exclude and persecute those who attempt to believe in something other than what
the atheist regime demands.
18.
Persecuted Christiansin the People's Republic of China, supra note 15.
The Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's Congress
19.
(NPC) called outside human rights accusations "sheer nonsense" and "absolutely
absurd," stating that "In China, there are no 'underground religious organizations'
at all. This is something fabricated by some western people." Chinese NPC
Refutes EPResolution, XINHUA GENERAL NEws SERVICE, Jan. 31, 2000, LEXIS, NonUS News, Domestic Political News. In response to a proposed anti-China
resolution in the U.S., China's Vice-Foreign Minister and chief of the Chinese
delegation for Sino-US human rights talks Wang Guangya insisted that the U.S.
was "using human rights as an excuse to undermine China's political stability and
development." China-Anti-ChinaAttempt Would Hurt U.S. Ties, CHINA DAILY, Jan.
31, 2000, LEXIS, Non-US News.
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government aims to "eliminate" both the unregistered churches
20
and every one of their individual members.
Meanwhile, in spite of these known abuses, the economicallyadvantaged China currently enjoys open trade relations with the
United States pursuant to an annual agreement between the two
countries and a long-term U.S. trade deficit with the foreign
power. 2 1 President Clinton, who criticized President Bush for
coddling dictators less than a decade ago, welcomed Chinese
President Jiang Zemin as an honored guest to the White House in
1997, and again in 2000.22

As a gesture of friendship and

diplomacy, Clinton also welcomed Chinese commander General
Chi, the militant general responsible for ordering the deaths of
student protesters in the Tiananmen Square massacre, into the
White House for lunch.2 3 The U.S. President proceeded "with
callous audacity" to commemorate the tenth anniversary of that
massacre by recommending to Congress "Normal Trade Relations"
(PNTR) status for China. 2 4 As of this note's publication date, the
U.S. Congress recently passed legislation that provides for
permanent normal trade relations with China and supports its
admittance to the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 5 All of this
happens in the United States while the unabated persecution and
abuse continue abroad and while people like Bishop Su Zhemin
and the millions in the persecuted church pray for relief. This is
beyond persecution. For many, it has become a matter of life and
death.

20.
Free the Bishops, supra note 5.
21.
Family Research Council, Morality in Foreign Policy, at http://www.
frc.org/faq/faq9.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2000). The concept of "Normal Trade
Relations" was formerly known as "Most Favored Nation" status, a position China
has enjoyed despite having one of the world's most atrocious human rights
records. Id.
22.
President Clinton most recently met with Zemin in New York on
September 8, 2000 for a 90-minute bilateral meeting, http://usinfo.state.gov/
regional/ea/uschina/chhrts.htm. See the background briefing on that visit and
other information related to U.S.-China relations at the Department of State's
"United States and China" website, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/ uschina.
23.
Melissa McClard & Loralei Gillaim, True Persecution, PROVIDENCE J.,
Mar. 27, 1997, http://www.frc.org/articles/ar97edgr.html. General Chi was the
commander who ordered the slaughter of hundreds of demonstrating students at
Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Id.
24.
William Saunders, What's "Normal"About Free Trade with China:, at
http://www.frc.org/perspective/pv99gtgr.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2000).
25.
Congress' Permanent Normal Trade Relations vote is expected soon
after the legislative session reopens in September 2000, and already has received
much support in both the House and Senate. For transcripts of June and July
2000 debates on this issue, see http://www.igeapwetexchange.usia.gov. Webbased transcripts are also on file with author.
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Persecution like this is not limited to the Far East. All over
the world, people of faith are suffering under predominately
Islamic and former Communist governments who ban religious
services and Bibles, and imprison missionaries and converts. In
at least one nation, Christians are still being crucified for what
they believe. 2 6 The stories 2 7 are horrifying:
In Sudan, the present regime eradicates any non-Islamic
expressions of people and controls the food supply of refugees
dumped in the desert.
Non-Muslims are given the choice of
converting to Islam or being denied food, clothing and shelter. The
unconverted are left to die, naked in the blazing sun. For the
converted there is no turning back: Sudan applies the death
28
penalty to anyone who tries to leave Islam.

In Russia, the government recently passed repressive laws
targeting those of religious faith with the backing of the Russian
Orthodox Church.
As a result, there is increasing official
discrimination and violence against religious minorities with
Jews, Protestants, Catholics and dissident orthodox groups all
29
falling under attack.
Claiming to hear their cries, the United States, a world
superpower and leading member of the United Nations, has
vowed to make international religious freedom a foreign policy
priority through potentially powerful domestic legislation. Their
latest attempt to curb religious persecution around the world is

26.
Religious PersecutionAround the World, at http://www.frc.org/podium/
pd9661rg.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2000). Crucifixions have been documented in
Ethiopia. Id.
27.
Dr. James C. Dobson, FAMILY NEWS FROM DR. JAMES DOBSON (Focus on
the Family, Colorado Springs, Colo.), Oct. 1999, at 1-2. "Peter Tibi, a southern
Sudanese pastor . . . described the injuries inflicted upon his father by the
Northern Sudanese: He told us, 'My parents were Christians in Sudan. My father
was arrested by the Arabs at that time. They accused him of spying for the
southerners. His eyes [were] gouged out.. . ." Id. at 1. For the 1995 Peakaboo
documentary "The Right to be Nuba," Nuban Kamal Tutu described other
Sudanese atrocities, particularly one concerning a government attack on a
southern Sudanese church:
They caught the priest . . . and slaughtered him. [They also killed] ...
other priests. Many people were burned in the church. Then they tied me
and left me in the sun. After they burned the church with the people
inside, the military threw me into the embers of the church and left. Id.
Because Tutu's hands were so disfigured by the attack, he can no longer
even eat on his own.
Id.
28.
Paul Marshall, Religious Freedom and the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, at http://www.frc.org/insight/is98f4rg.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2000). Marshall is a leading authority on religious persecution
and the author of HUMAN RIGHTS THEORIES and JUST POLITICS.
29.
Id.
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the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (hereinafter
referred to as IRFA).30 With the IRFA, the United States now has
the potential authority to promote both religious tolerance and
freedom and to condemn persecution of all religious faiths in
3
every country, including China. '
Of course, such a responsibility cannot be effectively
assumed without concrete evidence of the size of the task at
hand. Pursuant to the terms of the IRFA, the first two Annual
Reports on religious freedom were released in September 1999
and September 2000, the first marking the culmination of
eighteen months of study on the status of religious freedom in
over 180 countries worldwide.3 2 With all the evidence that has
now been obtained as a result, new questions arise over whether
the United States was in its right place and doing the right thing
when it passed the IRFA. If so, does this Act have any true bite or
is it simply political rhetoric which reflects a true commitment on
the part of the United States to alleviating religious persecution?
How will offending nations respond to the Act, or will they bother
to respond at all? What will and should the United States do in
response if that occurs?
This Note will address the above questions.
Part I will
discuss the prior attempts of the United Nations and United
States to champion the cause of faith-related international policy.
Part II will outline the provisions of the United States' most recent
attempt, the IRFA. Part III will reveal the conclusions of the
IRFA's first two Annual Reports and discuss the United States'
current position with China, which the Reports found to be one of
the most egregious offenders of the IRFA. Part IV will expose the
strengths and the weaknesses of the IRFA, and what the United
States may have to do differently if it proposes to effectively lead
in this area of international human rights.

II. THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE CAUSE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
UNDER ITS WING: EARLY ATTEMPTS TO CURB INTERNATIONAL
PERSECUTION

In 1948, members of the United Nations pledged to cooperate
in the promotion of all recognized human freedoms by signing

30.
31.

22 U.S.C.A. § 6401 (West Supp. 2000).
Mark O'Keefe, With religious persecution documented Americans

consider how

to fight

it,

at

http://www.oregonlive.com.todaysnews/9810/

st102911 .html (last visited Feb. 26, 2000).
32.
See Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999 Report on
International Religious Freedom (Sept. 9, 1999) (on file with author).
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33
onto the U.N. Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.
Although the Declaration itself was created to be a non-binding
instrument, those who signed it pledged in the agreement's
language to morally and politically recognize that every human
34
right was deserving of international concern and protection.
Despite these promising beginnings, however, the United
Nation's enforcement of the right to religious freedom has been
weak. For example, in its search for implementation instruments
that would effectively give an enforcing "bite" to the Declaration,
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights completed two
additional clarifying covenants in 1954: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). The General Assembly, however, did not adopt these
covenants until 1966, and the United States did not sign them
3S
until 1992.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the legal codification of the 1948 Declaration by treaty, is
currently the only global treaty that intends to provide for both
the recognition and implementation of worldwide religious
freedom.3 6
The Declaration's original wording, however, was
severely watered-down in the language of the ICCPR.
In
particular, the ICCPR subjected religious freedom to "such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others."3 7 Contrary to the original Declaration,

33.

U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
34.
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 119 (1996).
35.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN

Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fisher, The Political Framework, in U.S.

RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3,

11,

20-23

(Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993).
36.
Senator Gordon Smith, Protecting the Weak: Religious Liberty in the
Twenty-First Century, 1999 BYU L. REV. 479, 480 (1999).
37.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316, (1966). Such "limitations" have now become excuses for governments
wishing to violate religious freedom, saying that their "culture" neither values nor
sees religious freedom in the same way as the Declaration. For an editorial
denouncement of the "cultural context" excuse, see Marshall, supra note 28.
Marshall argues:
It is no defense to say that a culture does not value or see religious
freedom in the same way as the Declaration.
The whole point of
recognizing human rights, and a universal declaration of human rights no
less, is to provide protection for rights that transcend cultural differences,
and it is precisely for those in a diversity of cultures that the Universal
Declaration exists.
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the ICCPR did not retain a right to change one's religion, but only
a right "to have or to adopt a religion," which means that one
could join a religion freely but then did not have the subsequent
right to change it. The 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief (DEIDRB) further restricted the operative language to
include only a right to "have a religion," as evidenced in the
revised Article 1(1).38 The DEIDRB, however, provided at the very
least for certain religious rights to remain protected, such as the
assembly and maintenance of places of worship, observance of
holy days and days of rest, the teaching of religion, and the use or
3 9
distribution of religious materials.
The international community soon realized that U.N.
leadership in protecting religious freedom, as it stood, posed
major logistical problems. Even if the United Nations attempted
to enforce the original Declaration's religious language, it lacks
the resources as an organization to independently respond
without the full support of all its members. The United Nations
could investigate and report violations, but its international
agreements did not provide for any remedies to effectively respond
to such violations. According to observers, "beyond the publicity
and embarrassment its reports create for the offending nations,
the United Nations ha[d] few other tools to fight religious
40
oppression."

Id.
38.
Marshall, supra note 28.
39.
John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the
American ConstitutionalExperiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 436 (1996).
40.
Marshall, supra note 28. In a related FRC article, former ambassador
Alan Keyes, Ph.D. argues that the U.N. necessarily fails with respect to enforcing
human rights because it does not incorporate any moral principles into its
understanding of politics. Alan Keyes, Reflections of an Ambassador, at
http://www.frc.org/insight/is99a3un.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2000). Keyes
says:
It is a failure that derives from a fundamentally wrong understanding of
politics-from the view that there can be a political whole that is not
ultimately rooted in a community of moral belief. No procedural or
organizational cleverness can bring tyrannical countries together with
principled ones to form a group that respects human liberty. The naive
expectation . . . reveals a fundamental inclination to accept the social
science vision of politics . . . [and results in a] document [that] is a

ungrounded moral facade-moral injunctions floating free of any principled
reason that would require assent, and thus moral words without a
corresponding soul ....
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
the United Nations itself, are in a way an enormous bluff. It is as though
the founders decided that the moment was right for a large scale effort at
pretending that moral agreement existed where it really did not.
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Perhaps the United Nations itself initially recognized these
problems, placing in its original Charter and Declaration a
provision allowing and encouraging member states-in addition to
participation in U.N. sponsored protection-to act either
independently, on a regional basis, or both to protect those
41
named rights on an international level.
Although treaties failed to reiterate and support this
provision for years, it finally reappeared in the Vienna Concluding
Document which empowered member states to implement their
own measures to "prevent and eliminate discrimination" and
"foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between
believers of different communities." 42 While present U.N.
leadership is either unwilling or unable to go beyond changing its
semantics on a fairly frequent basis to make religious freedom a
priority, it has effectively passed the torch to those who can, and
would, champion the cause independently. It is under this quasimandate that the United States now has chosen to act.
A. The Problem of Defining "Religion"
Part of the reason the United Nations has gradually
weakened the language protecting religious freedom is the lack of
international consensus on what "religion" really means. Stroud's
Judicial Dictionary defmes religion as "belief in and worship of
God... [R]eligion is concerned with man's relation to God, ethics
with man's relation to man."43 Black's Law Dictionary goes a bit
further, describing religion as a human's "relation to Divinity, to
reverence, worship, obedience and submission to mandates and
precepts of supernatural or superior beings. In its broadest sense
[it] includes all forms of belief in the existence of superior beings

41.
BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 940-56 (1995).
As Kristin N. Wuerffel notes, independent action by a state is often a politically
dangerous undertaking:
Acting independently, a state may choose which human rights deserve
more protection than others, or more specifically, which rights are more
important than others. Respect for a 'common understanding' of human
rights, for which the Declaration calls, may be easily replaced with a state's
own understanding. Thus, a state may create a hierarchy of human
rights, independent of international consensus and the United Nations.
Kristin N. Wuerffel, Discrimination Among Rights?: A Nation's Legislating a
Hierarchyof Human Rights in the Context of InternationalHuman Rights Customary
Law, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 369, 371 (Fall 1998). See later discussion of the
"hierarchy" problem infra Parts III and IV.
42.
Witte, supranote 39, at 437.
43.
STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 2218 (5th ed. 1986).
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exercising power over human beings by volition, imposing rules of

conduct, [or] with future rewards and punishments[.]" 44
Defining religion in the real world, however, is not so simple.

First, religious persecution complicates the matter - because it
often does not occur in isolation of other factors. One's religious
identity alone will seldom be the only indicator of persecution
because faith overlaps ethnic, political, territorial and economic
concerns as well. 4 5 In order to determine whether discrimination
or persecution is a violation of a religious human right, one must
ask the question: If the victim were of a different religion or held
other beliefs, would he or she still be the subject of the
persecution? 46 This is often a difficult question to answer.
Second, issues as to the scope of such freedom exist. Human

rights law, by thus far avoiding defining religion beyond the
ambiguously-interpreted word "belief," has left open the question

of what qualifies as "religious persecution" to be solved by
individual states and individual claimants. 4 7 For example, some
critics argue that "belief encompasses both religion and nonreligion. 4 8 The key is to find a way to strike an effective and

44.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY1292 (6th ed. 1990). Notice that this definition
would exclude agnostic or atheist claims of "religious persecution."
45.
Paul Marshall, The Persecutionof Christiansin the ContemporaryWorld:
Presentation to the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State on Religious
Freedom Abroad (July 2, 1997), at http://www.claremont.org/publications/
persecution.cfm.
46.
Id.
47.
Wood, infra note 48, Introduction.
48.
James E. Wood, Jr., An Apologia for Religious Human Rights, RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPEcTIVE 455 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte,
Jr., eds. 1996). Wood states:
Religious freedom must necessarily guarantee the freedom to choose a
religion (or no religion at all) and to live according to the dictates of that
religion ....
Religious human rights require the equality of all religions,
as well as irreligion, before the law, and that, according to the law, a
citizen neither enjoys advantages nor suffers disadvantages because of
one's religious faith or identity.
Id.
Some prominent U.S. scholars like Witte have endorsed the following definition
of the "essential liberties" that serve as minimum standards for religious freedom:
[L]iberty of conscience and non-discrimination on grounds of faith; free
exercise of religion; accommodation of pluralism in the sense of
confessional and institutional diversity; equality of all religions before the
law; separation of church and state in order to protect religious bodies and
believers from state interference in their internal affairs and private
religious lives (respectively); and disestablishment of religion, foreclosing
government from singling out any particular religion for preferential
treatment.
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protective balance. In the interest of fairness, one must look for
the broadest possible definition so that every religious claim and
claimant has a place to find recourse and remedy. The interest of
prudence, on the other hand, demands that a narrower definition
of religion than that currently used in the human rights arena be
constructed so that the mere concept of religion does not reach
49
the point of meaninglessness.
B.

The U.S. Respondsfrom History

Many domestic critics oppose state infringement in the
international religion arena because of inconsistencies between
national and international beliefs on what the operating standard
should be. 50
Others, however, justify U.S. responsive action
against religious persecution by citing America's traditional
understanding of its own religious liberties. 5 '
In the United
States, citizens enjoy a vast range of protections for religious
beliefs and practices under the First Amendment of the Bill of
Rights.5 2 Historically, U.S. citizens have known both the freedom

Johan D. van der Vyver, Introduction to RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GOLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE XI, XLV (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996)
(commenting on John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, The American
Constitutional Experiment in Religious Human Rights: The Perennial Search for
Principles, id. at 497.) This definition is somewhat problematic, however, as it
would seem to endorse a nationalistic, rather than an internationally focused view
toward religious freedom. For example, the "separation of church and state" and
the "free exercise" components should perhaps stay solely within the United
States and not unilaterally imposed on the greater U.N. community.
49.
Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Round Table Discussionon InternationalHuman
Rights Standards in the United States: The Case of Religion or Belief, 12 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 973, 999 (1998) (remarks of John Witte).
50.
Id. at 978. During this discussion, Jeremy Gunn argued that:
state establishments of religion are in fact inconsistent with the standards
of governmental noninterference with religious conscience .

.

.

. [T]he

argument that state establishments of religion are in accordance with
international standards because several states maintain establishments is
like saying that capital punishment is consistent with international
standards because some states continue to execute prisoners. When a
state maintains an establishment of religion it necessarily discriminates
against minority religions either by ostracizing minorities or by giving
material advantages to preferred religions. Thus, the only way that one
could have a religious establishment consistent with international
standards is when the benefits to the established religion are so minuscule
as to have no practical effect whatsoever.
Id.
51.

22 U.S.C.A. § 6401(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000).

52.

Ralph Reed, Priorities, CHRISTIAN AM., Jan./Feb.

explains:

1997, at 1.

Reed
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that comes with thinking freely and the pain that comes from
being persecuted for what they believe.5 3
Members of U.S.
religious traditions are particularly sensitive to issues
surrounding religious discrimination because of this history.5 4 In
fact, it is practically
impossible to remove the concept of religion
55
from U.S. politics.
International religious freedom legislation in Congress has
received strong bipartisan support despite occasional obstacles
placed in its path from other branches.5 6 For example, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, although passed by
the Senate 97-3, was found by the Supreme Court to be
unconstitutional as an infringement on the Court's power to
interpret the First Amendment.5 7 Despite this initial setback, the
Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998

Although a 'wall of separation between church and state' has evolved over
the past 200 years, most Americans believe that the government is
obligated to ensure that no one, including the government, interferes with
a person's rights to believe as he or she chooses ....
The wall between
church and state seems to prevent the U.S. government from interfering in
the business of religion. However, 'one would need to take a knife to our
history books and cut out the pages on the anti-slavery crusade, the
temperance movement, the women's movement, the civil rights struggle,
and the anti-Vietnam War protests.'
Id.
53.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6401(a)(1). The statute reads: "The right to freedom of
religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the United States ....
From
its birth to this day, the United States has prized this legacy of religious freedom
and honored this heritage by standing for religious freedom and offering refuge to
those suffering religious persecution." Id.
54.
Smith, supranote 36, at 482. Senator Smith argues:
Virtually every religious group in the United States has experienced
religious persecution at some point in its history ....
This is especially
true in light of the growth of secularism and bias against religious
institutions that has occurred in the post-war world. Above all, religious
individuals are committed to speaking out and preventing such abuses in
the future. This, along with the increasingly pluralistic nature of American
society, helps to explain the United States commitment to religious liberty
in both domestic and international contexts.
Id. at 493.
55.
See McCormick, supranote 1, at 289.
56.
There exists a potential separation of powers problem here that will not
be addressed in this Note beyond the following: although it is true that the
President, as Senior Executive Official of the U.S. government, holds
representative power in foreign policy matters, Congress now-as it has in the
past-has passed legislation in the IRFA mandating that human rights issues be
addressed in foreign policy matters.
57.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-000bb-4 (1994), as described in Smith, supra note
36, at 482. The RFRA required that the government must prove it had a
"compelling interest" before it would be allowed to abridge religious freedoms. 42
U.S.C. § 20000bb-l(b)(1), as discussed in Smith, supra note 36, at 482.
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passed unanimously.5 8 Most recently the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998 passed the Senate 98-0 and was signed into
law on September 9, 1998. As of yet, these measures have not
been questioned by the judiciary.
The IRFA is the latest attempt by the U.S. government to
unilaterally curb incidents of religious persecution worldwide.
John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, explained the U.S. administration's
convictions toward the issue of religious freedom as an early
version of the IRFA was being discussed in Congress.
"[Tihe
United States government," Shattuck stated, "plays a leading role
around the world in upholding the principle that the freedom of
religion, conscience, and belief is an inalienable and fundamental
human right.5 9
Religious freedom is not only an American
value ....
[Ilt is also a universally recognized human right."60
Through the IRFA6 1 and its 1999 amendments, Congress imposed
on the U.S. government the dual responsibilities of promoting and
protecting this important subset of human rights on an
62
international scale.

58.
Smith, supra note 36, at 483 (discussing Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112
State. 517 (1998)). The Act allowed tax deductions for religious contributions. Id.
59.
John Shattuck, Freedom From Religious PersecutionAct of 1997, Sept. 9,
1997, at http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/970909_shattuck-religion.html.
60.
Id.
61.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6401.
62.
Id. Section 640 1(a)(3) discusses Article 18 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which denoted religious freedom's rightful place as one of the
most-if not the most-inalienable human right: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship, or observance." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
The same section also makes note of Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which explains that " . . . governments have the

responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens and to pursue
justice for all. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of every individual,
regardless of race, sex, county, creed, or nationality, and should never be
arbitrarily abridged by any government." ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 18(1).
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998
AND INITIAL CONCERNS SURROUNDING THE PROPER ROLE OF
THE U.S. IN FOREIGN FAITH ISSUES

Congress recognized that freedom of religion, established as a
63
"fundamental right" by the several international instruments,
had come under such brutal attack in certain areas of the world
that a cohesive and immediate response to the persecution was
deemed necessary. 64 The IRFA is its latest answer. The act itself
describes an unjust and desperate international crisis that not
only asks for, but demands, a wholehearted political and
humanitarian response. 6 s As the Act's findings detail:
More than one-half of the world's population lives under regimes
that severely restrict or prohibit the freedom of their citizens to
study, believe, observe, and freely practice the religious faith of
their choice ....
Among the many forms of [government-sponsored
and government-tolerated] violations are state-sponsored slander
campaigns, confiscations of property, surveillance by security
police, including by special divisions of "religious police," severe
prohibitions against construction and repair of places of worship,
denial of the right to assemble and relegation of religious
communities to illegal status through arbitrary registration laws,
prohibitions against the pursuit of education or public office, and
prohibitions against publishing, distributing, or possessing
religious literature and materials...
Even more abhorrent, religious believers in many countries face
such severe and violent forms of religious persecution as detention,
torture,
beatings,
forced
marriage,
rape,
imprisonment,
enslavement, mass resettlement, and death merely for the peaceful
belief in, change of or practice of their faith. In many countries,
religious believers are forced to meet secretly, and religious leaders
66
are targeted by national security forces and hostile mobs.

To combat these atrocities, the IRFA established within the
executive branch a new outlook, a new agenda, and a new federal
agency, all with an accompanying two-part policy directive: (1) to
promote worldwide religious freedom, and (2) to condemn-and

63.
The instruments which articulate that religious freedom is a
fundamental right include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR,
the Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the U.N. Charter and
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6401(a)(2).
64.
Id. § 6401(b).
65.
See id. § 6401(a)(3).
66.
Id. § 6401(a)(4)(5).
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sanction-offending countries for violations of
when necessary, 67
religious freedom.
Acknowledging that religious freedom is a sensitive
international issue, Congress accordingly worded the IRFA to be a
malleable instrument by dictating that a U.S. or a cooperative
response to egregious violations of religious freedom be both
"vigorous" and "flexible." 68 The IRFA also differentiates between
two levels of persecution that the United States and the United
Nations plan to combat. The description of "particularly severe
violations of religious freedom" targets only the most horrendous
offenses, those the statute calls "systematic, ongoing egregious
violations of religious freedom."6 9 On the other hand, the broader
"violations of religious freedom" definition encompasses the wide
or those that lack the emergency and
range of less severe offenses
70
immediacy of the former.
A. GeneralDepartment of State and Other Executive
Responsibilities Under the IRFA

The IRFA instills in the President a wide range of powers over
enforcement, including, but not limited to, powers of commission
appointment, advisory powers, and diplomatic representation in
the area of religious freedom. 7 1 President Clinton delegated these
Secretary of State through a special
powers to the
72
memorandum.

67.
Id. U.S.C.A. § 6401(b)(1).
68.
Id. § 6401(b)(3).
Id. § 6402(11). The types of violations defined as "particularly severe"
69.
include: "(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (B)
prolonged detention without charges; (C) causing the disappearance of persons by
the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant
denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons." Id.
70.
Id. § 6402(13), which includes as simple "violations" offenses such as
"(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for (i) assembling for
peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including
arbitrary registration requirements; (ii) speaking freely about one's religious
beliefs; (iii) changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation; (iv) possession and
distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or (v) raising one's children in
the religious teachings and practices of one's choice." Id. § 6402(13)(A). Included
as "violations," emphasized in § 6402(13) are "any of the following acts if
committed on account of an individual's religious belief or practice: detention,
interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced
mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture,
mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution." Id. § 6402(13)(B).
Id. § 6411.
71.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6441, "Delegation of Responsibilities under the
72.
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998." Any reference to the "President" in
Part II should be interpreted as a presidential duty delegated to the Secretary of
State under this section.
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One of the most important and essential components of the
IRFA was the establishment of an Office on International
Religious Freedom within the U.S. Department of State, directed
by the Ambassador at Large for International
Religious
Freedom. 73
The Ambassador's duties include being the
President's "principal adviser" in matters pertaining to freedom of
religion, 7 4 assisting the Secretary of State in preparing the
religion-related portions of annual Human Rights Reports, 75
creating and submitting to Congress an Annual Report on
international religious freedom, 76 and serving as the United
States religious freedom diplomat to the nations.
Each Annual Report submitted by the Ambassador is
expected to have two main components: (1) a description of those
U.S. actions during the past year that have supported and
opposed violations of freedom of religion; and (2) recognition of
those countries who have improved-in policy, practice, or bothin protecting and promoting this most fundamental right.7 7 To
gather the most information about the international status of the
right at the least cost, missionary organizations-through the use
of an extensive network of non-government religious and human
rights groups-take a primary investigative role which removes
from the Commission the otherwise extremely expensive and
onerous responsibility of literally "going to the ends of the earth"
78
to get the relevant information.
Aside from these and other dictated Department of State
Activities, 79 perhaps the most intricate and integral part of the

73.
Id. § 6411 (a).
74.
Id. § 6411(2).
75.
Id. § 6412(a).
76.
Id. § 6412(b). The first two Annual Reports, which were released on
September 30, 1999 and September 9, 2000, will be described in detail along with
its implications later in this Note.
77.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6412(b)(1)(i)-(ii). Within the description of U.S. actions,
there is also included a list of the most continued, egregious religious freedom
offenders, those of "particular concern." Id. Regarding the second component of
the Annual Report, descriptions of improvement-to be most effective and capable
or repetition, contain also a thorough analysis of the nature of and factors
surrounding the improvement. Id.
78.
Id. § 6412(c). To assure consistency, the Act requires the responsible
U.S. mission organization to maintain reporting standards. Id.
79.
Other State Department responsibilities include establishing and
maintaining a comprehensive religious freedom internet cite containing all
relevant major international documents, Annual Reports, Executive Summaries,
etc., id. § 6413, a mandate that requires foreign mission organizations-both U.S.
and non-government-to seek whenever possible to meet with imprisoned
religious leaders, id. § 6414, and to slowly compile complete prisoner lists of those
persecuted for their faith, id. § 6417. The State Department also has the authority
to further encourage religious freedom awareness by allocating funds to those U.S.
diplomatic missions that actively develop programs to achieve that result, id.

1004

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoLo 33:987

IRFA is
Subchapter II, which creates
the all-important
Commission of International Religious Freedom.8 0
The tenmember Commission includes an Ambassador at Large8s and
nine other members, three of whom are appointed by the House,
Senate, and President respectively to serve two-year terms. 82 The
Commission's two primary responsibilities are to annually review
reports of violations from the various sources mentioned above,
and make appropriate policy recommendations on the basis of
those evaluations to the President and State Department. 8 3 The

President is

then

accordance

with

empowered
the

to

IRFA

oppose
and

those violations
the

in

Commission's

§ 6415. In addition, U.S. executive branch officials are encouraged to promote
religious freedom advocacy during meetings with foreign dignitaries, id. § 6417(a).
80.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6431. In addition, according to § 6435, the Commission
has been granted $3,000,000 to carry out its duties over the course of its trial fiveyear existence, which ends on May 14, 2003. Id. § 6436.
81.
The Ambassador at Large serves "ex officio." Although he is a nonvoting member, he carries several unique responsibilities.
The current
Ambassador-at-Large is Dr. Robert A. Seiple, formerly of World Vision and now
with the State Department. Press Release, Rabbi Saperstein Elected Chairas U.S.
Commission on InternationalReligion Freedom Holds Inaugural Meeting, Religious
Action Center of Reform Judaism, at http:/www.rac.org/news/062299.html. On
June 22, 1999, the members of the Commission unanimously elected Rabbi
Saperstein as Chair of the Commission. Id.
82.
Id. § 6431(b)(1)(B) and (c)(1). According to §6431(b)(2)(A), "members of
the Commission [shall be] selected among distinguished individuals noted for their
knowledge and experience in fields relevant to the issue of international religious
freedom, including foreign affairs, direct experience abroad, human rights, and
international law." The inaugural Commission, which convened on June 21,
1999, was composed of the following members: Rabbi David Sapperstein, Director,
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism; Michael K Young, Dean, George
Washington Law Center; Elliot Abrams, Ethics and Public Policy Center; Laila AlMarayati, M.D., Past President, Muslim Women's League; John R. Bolton, Senior
Vice-President, American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, Secretary of
External Affairs, National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the United States;
Most Reverend Theodore McCarrick, Archbishop of Newark; Nina Shea, Director,
Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom House; Justice Charles Z. Smith,
Washington State Supreme Court. See Saperstein, supranote 81.
83.
Id. § 6432(a).
The Commission is also required to consider the
potential effects of the policies, if implemented, on the involved religious
communities. Id. § 6432(d). Such recommendations in response to progress may
include: private commendation, diplomatic commendation, official public
commendation, commendation within multilateral fora, an increase in cultural or
scientific exchanges, or both, termination of existing Presidential actions, an
increase in certain assistance funds, and invitations for working, official, or state
visits. Id. § 6432(c). Recommendations in response to violations, on the other
hand, may include diplomatic inquiry, diplomatic protest, official public protest,
demarche of protest, condemnation within multilateral fora, delay or cancellation
of cultural or scientific exchanges, delay or cancellation of working, official, or
state visits, reduction of certain assistance funds, termination of certain
assistance funds, imposition of targeted trade sanctions, imposition of broad trade
sanctions, and withdrawal of the chief of mission. Id. § 6432(b).
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recommendations, taking the action that "most appropriately
84
respond[s] to the nature and severity of the violations."
In choosing a proper course of action in each case, the
President is required to attempt to "minimize any adverse impact"
on the citizens of the violating nation and the U.S. and foreign
humanitarian activities therein.8s For example, in response to
what is deemed to be a "particularly severe" violation, the IRFA
requires the President to first designate the offending nation as
one "of particular concern" and determine the agency or officials
responsible for the violations. Before any action is taken, the
President must first request and enter into "consultation" with
the offending country regarding the violations and, where
appropriate, keep the results of those negotiations private so as
not to jeopardize any agreements made pursuant to those
86
negotiations through public disclosure.
The primary objective is not to punish, but instead to enter
into a "binding agreement" with the offending foreign government
that obligates that government to cease or phase out those
practices that are in violation of the IRFA.8 7 The IRFA also
provides the President with an exhaustive list of sanctions,
including trade-related sanctioning measures against the
offending nation, which may be used as a last resort.8 8

84.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6441.
85.
Id. § 6441(c)(2).
86.
Id. § 6443(b)(1)(A) and (3). Section (3) reads: "If negotiations are
undertaken or an agreement is concluded with a foreign government regarding
steps to cease the pattern of violations by that government, and if public
disclosure of such negotiations or agreement would jeopardize the negotiations or
the implementation of such agreement, as the case may be, the President may
refrain from disclosing such negotiations and such agreement to the public,
except that the President shall inform the appropriate congressional committees of
the nature and extent of such negotiations and any agreement reached." Id.
87.
Id. § 6445(c). Unfortunately, it is unclear under whose legal authority
these 'binding agreements" lie.
88.
Id. § 6445(a). In reference to trade-related sanctions, the President
may "direct" the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the
issuance of any (or a specified number of) guarantees, insurance, extensions of
credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to the specific
government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the
President to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this title,"
or may order "the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any
(or a specified number of) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific
authority (or a specified number of authorities), to export any goods or technology
to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or
determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or
6442 of this title," or may prohibit "the United States Government from procuring,
or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from
the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President
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The President must provide a complete report to Congress
within ninety days of action. The report must identify the action
taken with respect to the offending foreign country, a description
of the violations giving rise to such action, the President's
purpose behind the specific action, and a thorough evaluation of
the action's impact on the offending foreign government, the
89
offending country's general population, and the U.S. economy.
The report must also contain, if applicable, a description of all the
prior failed non-economic policy attempts made by the United
States to bring about the cessation of the violations, as well as
descriptions of any multilateral negotiations involved in the
90
particular case.
B. Recruiting: Enlisting InternationalSupport
The United States, which has repeatedly proven itself to be a
world-wide trendsetter in various peacekeeping efforts, 9 1 has
declared its hope in the IRFA that it will be only among the first of
many nations to recognize and support the need for proactive
change. 92 Accordingly, it is the primary responsibility of the
United States to promote the cause of religious freedom
worldwide. The language chosen by Congress demonstrates the
desire to motivate a multi-national effort to enforce international
religious freedom obligations. 93 Therefore, one of the IRFA's main
objectives is to enlist and engage other countries in an
international promotional effort through both binding advocacy
agreements and cooperative initiatives.
The IRFA reinforces its international teamwork goal by
foreign
other
with
consultation
additional
encouraging
coordinated
a
of
achieving
purposes
"for
governments
international policy on actions that may be taken with respect to
The President is also charged to
afn offending] country."94
consult with the appropriate international humanitarian groups,
religious organizations, and interested parties in the United

to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this title."

Id.

§ 6445(a).

89.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6444. According to § 6444(a)(4)(B), the President may
again withhold from public disclosure the evaluative portion of the report, but
must completely disclose this information to Congress.
90.

Id. § 6444(a)(5) and (6).

91.
For further discussion of the U.S. efforts in Desert Storm, Kosovo, and
Israel, see infra Part IV.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6401(b)(2), which provides for the channeling of U.S.
92.
security and development assistance to foreign governments interested in joining
the human rights effort.
93.

Id. § 6401(b)(4).

94.

Id. § 6443(b)(2).
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States to uncover the potential impact of any agreements or
actions prior to acting.9 5
C. InitialDomestic Reaction to the IRFA
Prior to its passage, domestic reaction to the proposed
legislation contained in the IRFA ranged from skepticism to

outright opposition. As John Shattuck outlined in legislative
hearings on the bill, the Clinton Administration feared that the
Act would be more likely to harm than aid persecuted peoples,
would likely harm U.S. relations with other international powers,
would create a "confusing bureaucratic structure" that would
conflict with the Department of States own efforts, or would place
religious concerns on a hierarchy above all other civil and
political rights. 9 6 The National Council of Churches originally
refused to support the legislation for many of these same reasons,
fearing that the United States would become the "religious police
97
of the world" as a result of the Act.
At the core of these concerns was the IRFA's sanctioning
provisions, which called for heavy penalties for countries
engaging in continued religious persecution.9" These concerns
and others were addressed and apparently resolved by the time
the IRFA became law in September of 1998. 9 9 Its sanctions,
however, were watered down by the time the final draft was
approved.
The IRFA's current sanctions still appear harsh, a fact which
continues to aggravate the Act's critics. A closer look at the
adopted language, however, indicates that the threat of sanctions
may now be nothing more than aggressive rhetoric. For example,
although the Secretary of State is required to "take action," she
has considerable flexibility because in reality the U.S. government
can choose to do little or nothing in response to violations of the
IRFA. 10 0
According to the Act's sanctioning provisions, a
determination that a foreign country has engaged in severe
violations does not automatically require the U.S. government to
terminate assistance or halt any current activities with that
country. 10 1 In addition, the President may even choose to waive

95.
96.

Id. § 6443(c) and (d).
Shattuck, supranote 59.
97.
Religious Freedom Act Gets Wide Acclaim, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov.
4, 1998, at 1015.
98.
Shattuck, supranote 59.
99.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6441 et. seq.
100. Id. § 6442.
101. Id. § 6442(d).
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his power to act if either the foreign government is no longer in
violation or it is in the "important national interest of the United
States" to do so. 10 2 This language creates a fairly substantial
loophole through which the U.S. government can escape in order
to overlook religious violations when other relationships, such as
trade, are deemed to be more beneficial, as will be discussed later
in the Note.
As Robert Seiple, Ambassador at Large for Religious
Freedom, noted upon release of the first Annual Report, the U.S.
currently has no intention of imposing sanctions, even upon the
most egregious offenders, until some point in the distant and
indefinite future.10 3
Despite this expectation and the many
penalty alternatives, there remains concern over the watereddown and flexible sanction provisions. For example, the Institute
for International Economics claimed that over the last thirty
years, sanctions imposed by the United States have only had a
thirteen percent success rate due to the current dependency on
the developing global marketplace which results in "less
vulnerable targets and less unilateral leverage" for the United
States.' 0 4
The American Society of International Law echoed
these concerns as late as April of 1999:
We... believe sanctions will be counterproductive .... [W]hile the
imposition of sanctions is likely to have little direct impact on most
governments engaged in abuses, it runs the risk of strengthening
the hand of those governments and extremists who seek to incite
religious intolerance .... If the United States does not have the
flexibility to determine when and how to condemn violators, we
could endanger the well-being of those we are trying to help. This
would limit U.S. efforts to work collectively with other nations to
promote religious freedom, reconciliation, and peace, not to
105
mention other critical national security objectives.

102. Id. § 6447 (a)(3).
103. From Dr. Seiple's comments at a State Department briefing in
September, 1999, at http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1999/990909_
seiple-kohjrf.html. Seiple assured reporters that "[t]he act itself was never
conceived primarily to be a sanctions act. Sanctions are a last resort, and the
sanction portion of this act is a very nuanced, a very sophisticated approach. It is
essentially a menus approach, fifteen different sanctions, anywhere from a private
demarche to withdrawal of economic aid. And the provision allows the secretary a
great deal of flexibility and latitude." Id.
104. Bob Kolasky, Religious Persecution: You've Got to Fight, 3
intellectualcapital.com 18, 3 (April 30, 1998), at http://www.intellectualcapital.
com/issues/98/0430/icissue.b.asp (quoting Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic
Sanctions Revisited, an Institute for International Economics Study).
105. Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practiceof the UnitedStates Relating to
InternationalLaw: Sanctions Against States ToleratingReligious Persecution,93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 480, 481 (April 1999). The Oregonian, an Oregon-based on-line newspaper,
cited USA Engage, a coalition of 497 U.S. businesses, for the argument that ineffective
sanctions would hurt U.S. business without effectively accomplishing their goals. See
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It was the potential economic consequence attached to imposing
sanctions on economically-valuable nations, not the potentially
bad
humanitarian
effects,
which
caused
the
Clinton
Administration to initially oppose an earlier and harsher version
of the IRFA. 1 0 6 The Administration, believing that U.S. foreign
policy should be exclusively focused on trade, 10 7 claimed that the
bill would arbitrarily drop a dark cloak of sanctions on nations,
many of which are oil and gas rich, or offer market opportunities
that would be politically damaging for U.S. oil companies'
10 8
relations.
Domestic reactions to the IRFA reached beyond the executive
branch and into several activist organizations as well. Although
many Christian movements applauded the law's passage, 10 9 as
did the well-known Anti-Defamation League, 1 10 the Association of
American Atheists (AAA)-at the other extreme-labeled the Act
"blasphemy" and challenged the United States on its positions
concerning non-religious political prisoners like atheist writers
Salman Rushdie and Taslima Nasrin. 11 1 Still other domestic

O'Keefe, supra note 31, at http:/www.oregonlive.com/todaysnews/9810/st102911.
html. Among the members of USA Engage are Apple Computer, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, AT&T, and the National Association of Manufacturers. See Kolasky, 3
Intellectualcapital.com 18, at http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/98/0430/
icissue.asp. This concern, however, mostly results from a failure to understand the
Secretary's multifaceted approach to combating violations.
106.
Shattuck, supranote 59.
107. Jacob Heilbrun, ChristianRights: The Next Big Conservative Issue, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, July 7, 1997 at 19.
108. Kimberly Music, Clinton Opposes Religious Persecution Bill, THE OIL
DAILY, Sept. 10, 1997, at 1. An Administration official recently stated that "many
.. still believe that commercial policy is a tool of foreign policy, when it should
more often be the other way around-the United States should use all its foreign
policy levers to achieve commercial goals." Id.
109. Supporters of the IRFA included the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Conference,
the National Association of Evangelicals, the Southern Baptist Ethics and
Religious Liberty Committee, the International Campaign for Tibet, the AntiDefamation League, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations, the Salvation Army, the Christian Coalition, the
Family Research Council, Evangelicals for Social Action, Prison Fellowship, the
Middle East Christian Committee (who represents Lebanese Christians, Copts,
Assyro-Chaldeans, Syriacs, Southern Sudanese, Iranian Christians, and
Pakastani-Bangladeshi Christians), and the National Jewish Coalition. Many of
these same organizations are also currently members of the Coalition for the Free
Exercise of Religion, listed at http://www.religious-freedom.org/coalition.html.
110. Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, ADL Urges Passage of
International Religious Freedom Act (October 2, 1998), at http://www.adl.org/
presrele%Sfold2/mise%5F00/3246%500.html. The Anti-Defamation League was
founded in 1913 and is an international presence, fighting Anti-Semitism
worldwide through its programs and services. Id.
111.
American Atheist Forum, Blasphemy, Religious Persecution and the
International Religious Freedom Act (Oct. 6, 1998), at http://www.american
atheist.org/forum/blasphemy.html. Rushdie has reportedly been under a death
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critics accuse the United States of being a "global busybody,"
claiming that its religious freedom advocacy has nothing to do
with the "vital strategic or economic interests of the United
States" n 2 and that it frustrates the separation between church

and state.

n3

Perhaps the greatest criticism voiced thus far is that the IRFA

effectively creates a U.S.-sponsored hierarchy, placing religious
freedom above all other human rights. 1 14 According to scholars
who adhere to this view, the human right of religious freedom
under the IRFA no longer exists on the same level as other rights
like political freedom or due process rights; it instead becomes
the "highest human right"" 5 contrary to U.N. assertions as to the
indivisibility of human rights.
For the purposes of the IRFA,
religious freedom is no longer one right among equals, but one
above the rest.
The special protection afforded to religious
freedom skews the nature of the rights itself, because religious
1 16
freedom moves to the apex of a hierarchy of human rights.

sentence since 1989 in Iran for writing The Satanic Verses, a book the Iranian
government considers insulting to Islamic beliefs. Id. Nasrin has been hunted by
Bangladeshie authorities for speaking out for women's rights there. Id. The AAA
cited statements of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court that
provisions guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion protect not only religious
beliefs, but also other beliefs of a similar fundamental character, including
atheism and agnosticism. Id. The U.S. government has not yet responded to this
particular concern, although by recognizing non-religion as well as religion within
the scope of religious human rights would inevitably give rise to serious
definitional problems as discussed earlier, and would not protect but instead
diminish particularly "religious" human rights concerns to ineffectual
meaninglessness. Id.
112. John Shattuck, "U.S. Policies in Support of Religious Freedom: Focus
on Christians," Briefing Before the U.S. Department of State (July 22, 1997),
http://www.state.gov/www.policy-remarks/970722.
113. Id.
114. For foundational theory on the inappropriateness of creating a human
rights hierarchy by singling out certain rights above others, see THEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 80 (1989). For a more

contemporary analysis focusing on the IRFA's effects in particular, see Wuerffel,
supra note 41, at 407, 412. Wuerffel argues that the IRFA wrongly established a
"de facto preference for religious rights." Id. at 407. Wuerffel also states that "to
honor the interdependent nature of human rights, the United States must
legislate a way in which to deal with violations of human rights and commit to the
protection of all, instead of only one." Id. at 412.
115. Wuerffel, supranote 41, at 408.
116. Id. Wuerffel finds that interrelatedness is a necessity for human rights,
and points to U.N. language in various documents to support that theory. Id. at
403, 404. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states:
[I]n accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal
of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
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IV. THE FIRST TWO ANNUAL REPORTS AND CURRENT U.S. ACTIONS
Almost a full year after the IRFA was passed and the initial
attacks ceased, the release of the first Annual Report on Religious
Freedom on September 30, 1999 caused many of these original
concerns to resurface with a renewed vengeance.
This first
Report covered the period from January 1, 1998 to June 30,
1999, and reflected eighteen months of "dedicated effort" by the
State Department, Foreign Service, and various U.S. embassies.
Dr. Robert Seiple, Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom, explained that the "simple" goal of the Report
was "to create a comprehensive record of the state of religious
freedom around the world, to highlight the most significant
violations of the right to religious freedom, and to help the
7
persecuted.""
Hailing its release, Ambassador Seiple applauded the "great
lengths to which U.S. Foreign Service Officers went to gather such
detailed information, investigate reports of human rights abuse,
monitor elections, and come to the aid of believers who are at risk
in their current situation, the officers doing so often at great
personal risk."" 8
These officers, stationed at various U.S.
embassies throughout the world, prepared the initial report drafts
and gathered information from a variety of sources including
government
and
religious
officials,
non-governmental
organizations, journalists, human rights monitors, religious
groups and academics. Information from the embassies' initial
efforts were then forwarded to Washington for careful review by
several executive agencies within the Department of State." 9
These agencies worked together to create a thorough and
objective
report, synthesizing the embassies'
effort with

everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic,
social, and cultural rights.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, art. 2(1).
117. Dr. Robert Seiple, Briefing, Release of the 1999 Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom (Sept. 9, 1999), http://www.state.gov/www/
policyremarks/ 1999/990909_seiple_koh_irf.html. The Second Annual Report,
released very recently in September 2000, echoes the first Report and reemphasizes this Note's primary focus: China's continuing religious prosecuting.
See Section V for a thorough discussion of this issue. A copy of this most recent
Report can be downloaded from the Department of State's website at
http://www.state.gov.
118. Id.
119. These agencies include the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor and its Offices of International Religious Freedom, Country Reports and
Asylum Affairs, and Bilateral Affairs, in cooperation with other State Department
offices. Id.
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information obtained by a myriad of other sources including
human
rights
groups,
foreign
government
officials,
representatives from the United Nations and other international
and regional organizations and institutions, experts from
academia and the media, experts on issues of religious
discrimination and persecution, religious leaders, and experts on
120
legal matters.
In total, the 1999 Report outlines the relevant activities, both
good and bad, of over 180 countries worldwide. The Commission
applies IRFA standards to every one of these researched nations,
including theocracies, totalitarian states, and democracies,
looking for systematic violations where religion has played a
substantial
role. 12 1
Regarding
the administration
and
implementation of the Commission's conclusions, Seiple further
explained: "There are two points of discernment in this process.
One is what is going on ... [but] the next point of discernment is
more difficult: What do you do about it?" 1 22 As detailed below,
the second point has proven not only to be logistically difficult,
but also extremely problematic in both a social and political
sense.
A.

'What's Going On"

The 1999 Annual Report defines the various barriers to
religious freedom, and groups offenders according to the type of
barrier they pose to the realization of religious freedom:
(1)
totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, 12 3 (2) governments hostile

120. See Preface to 1999 U.s. Dept. of State Report on International
Religious Freedom, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human.rights/irf/irf
preface99.html.
121. Seiple, supra note 117.
122. Id.
123. Executive Summary, in 1999 U.S. Dept. of State Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom, http://www.state.gov/www/giobal/human.
rights/irf/irftrpt/ 1999/irf_exec99.html.
Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are defmed by the degree to which
they seek to control thought and expression, especially dissent. It is not
uncommon for such regimes to regard minority religious groups as
enemies of the State because of the content of the religion, the fact that the
very practice of religion threatens the dominant theology (often by diverting
loyalties of adherents toward something beyond the State), the ethnic
character of the religious group, or a mixture of all three. When this
association occurs, the result is often religious persecution directed by the
regime.
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to minority religions, 12 4 (3) "tolerant" countries whose laws and
policies facially discourage persecution but allow private violators
to go unpunished, 12 5
(4) countries whose laws favor certain
religions over others, 126 and (5) countries who indiscriminately
12 7
identify minority religions as dangerous sects or cults.
B. "What to Do About It"
Once the offenders are determined based on the objective
standards set forth in the IRFA, the next step is to decide on an
appropriate response based on an understanding of why that
nation has imposed these particular barriers to religious freedom.
As Congress and the Commission soon recognized, however, this
inquiry is much more complicated than the "one-size-fits-all"
remedy previous U.N. agreements had adopted. Although the
U.S. government as a whole has thus far tried not to stray from
this traditional U.N. methodology, Congress in particular has
slowly realized that a more subjective approach is necessary to
most effectively address the issue of how to advocate the
"universal principles" underlying religious freedom, as reflected in
the flexible remedy provisions of the IRFA. 128 Congress' flexible
and more comprehensive approach is now increasingly being
integrated into public foreign policy channels via international
exchanges, Worldnet and VOA broadcasts, a religious freedom
website within the homepage of the Department of State,
conferences, public opinion polling, congressional hearings, and

124. Id. "Some governments, while not necessarily determined to implement
a program of control over minority religions, are nevertheless hostile to certain
religions and implement policies designed to intimidate them, cause their
adherents to convert to another religion, or cause their members to flee." Id.
125. Id. "In some countries governments have laws or policies to discourage
religious discrimination and persecution but fail to act with sufficient consistency
and vigor against violations of religious freedom by nongovernmental entities." Id.
126. Executive Summary, supranote 123.
Some governments have implemented laws or regulations that favor certain
religions and place others at a disadvantage. Often this circumstance is
the result of the historical predominance of one religion in a country and
may reflect broad social skepticism about new or minority religions.
Sometimes it stems from the emergence of a country from a long period of
Communist rule, in which all religion was prohibited or at best out of
favor. In such countries, skepticism or even fear of certain religions or all
religions lingers within segments of society. This has led in some cases to
a curtailment of religious freedom.
Id.
127.
1999 U.S. Dept. of State International Religious Freedom Report Fact Sheet,
http://www.state.gov/www/ogobal/human.rights/irf/irf-rpt/fs.990909_irf.html.
128. Executive Summary, supra note 123.
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speeches and press conferences by senior U.S. foreign policy
officials.

129

Within the restrictive confines of international human rights
law, however, individual states are responsible for sorting out
competing interests in formulating policies that adequately
protect the rights of all involved. For example, in some societies,
a change in religious beliefs may have far-reaching social
ramifications, whereas in others, such a change will have only an
internal impact.
The problem, therefore, in laying down
internationally constructed requirements is that different nations
inevitably prioritize human rights differently and often hold
differing views on the necessity of regulating, and the wisdom of
influencing, religious choices of their people that conflict with
1 30
international norms.
The 1999 Report claims that "[t]he United States seeks to
promote religious freedom, not simply to criticize, or to make
headlines."' 3 '
Steve McFarland, Executive Director of the
Commission on International Religious Freedom, stated that he
feared that the United States. would fail to effectively respond to
the first Report's objective findings, particularly in compliance
with the IRFA's requirement of naming those nations responsible
for severe violations by September ist of each year. 13 2 According
to McFarland, the test of U.S. commitment to ending religious
persecution would be whether Cuba, Sudan, and especially China

129.
Id. The Summary noted that U.S. overseas mission efforts constituted
the Commission's "front line" in pursuing religious freedom. Id. This training,
according to the summary, "requires clear explanations both of the American
approach to religious freedom in the United States, and of the U.S. practice of
applying only international standards in its assessment of foreign governments."
Id. This highly subjective component-determining the appropriate remedy-is
essential to the effective implementation of the remedies provided for in the
statute. For example, a nation's policy on religious freedom often can be "better
understood in the context of its history, culture, and tradition-a particular
religion may have dominated the life of a nation for centuries, making more
difficult the acceptance of new faiths that offer challenges in both cultural and
theological terms." Id. Although citing to tradition and culture should not be
encouraged or used as a superficial pretext for legislation or policies that restrict
genuine religious belief or its legitimate manifestations, understanding this
context greatly helps the Secretary to construct a proper diplomatic response if
one is possible.
130.
See Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in
InternationalHuman Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 253.
131.
Executive Summary, supranote 123.
132. Julia Lieblich, Religious freedom law proves challenging, THE HOLLAND
SENTINEL, Oct. 2,

1999, http://www.thehoIIandsentinel.net/stories/100299/relI

relfreedom.html. Steve McFarland formerly served as Director of the Christian
Legal Society's Center for Law and Religious Freedom before being appointed to
his position as chairman of the Commission (known by author based on active
work with the Christian Legal Society).
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are named among the greatest offenders on that date or whether
the United States would allow "good politics" to obstruct the
reality of persecution. 13 3 McFarland's concerns, as well as those
of other skeptics who feared that subjective political allegiances
would distort the Act's objective results, were initially calmed to a
substantial extent when China and Sudan both made that list.
C. China Ranks High on Religious Freedom "Offender"List
China is at the forefront of current events on the
international religious freedom front. On October 6, 1999, the
U.S. State Department, in a somewhat surprising apolitical move,
designated China among the top five countries "of particular
34
concern" for religious freedom violations.1
As a Communist regime since 1949, the People's Republic of
China has one of the world's most depressing human rights
records which includes forced abortion, 13 5 violent political
repression, and religious persecution.
Although the Chinese
Government recognizes the right to freedom of religion in
principle, it is quick to clarify that it does so only to the extent
compatible with the security and development of a purely socialist
13 6
state.
China is not indifferent to its citizen's religious choices; on
37
the contrary, it wishes to completely control those choices.'
The ultimate goal of China's religious policy is to eliminate
individual faith in something beyond the power of the state, as
the ruling Communist Party believes that religion should wither
away over time for the good of society. 13 8
Although the
government now officially rejects the use of force to bring about
this goal, it is to this end that religious policy is ultimately

133. Id.
134. China was again named as a "country of particular concern" in the
2000 Report, emphasizing that nation's continued and unabated persecution of
faith-based communities within its boundaries. The Department designated
China, Burma, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan as the five worst violators, as mandated by
the IRFA. Id.
135. The Family Research Council described the horror of forced abortion in
one instance: "Before being deported from Australia to China, Zhu Qingping, eight
months pregnant, was promised she would not be forced to abort her child. When
she arrived, however, she was forced into a car and taken to the hospital, where
her child was aborted against her will." Saunders, supranote 24.
136. See Document 19: The Basic Viewpoint in the Religious Question
During Our County's Socialist Period § IV (March 1982), reprinted in R. Lanier
Britsch, The Current Legal Status of Christianityin China, 1995 BYU L. REV. 347,
app. 1, at 370.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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directed. 13 9 The Party's expressed calling is to "aggressively
propagate atheism:" all Party members must be avowed
atheists 140 and the only proselytism politically condoned by the
state is that which is aimed at convincing religious believers to
41
abandon their beliefs.'
As a result, the sphere within which religious activities may
be legally conducted under the Communist regime is extremely
small, and is only getting smaller. 14 2 In the 1950's, the Chinese

139.
Document 6: Issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party
and the State Council on Some Problems Concerning Further Improving Work on
Religion, reprinted in Britsch, supranote 136, app. 2, at 384.
140.
Document 19, supra note 136, § IV at 369 ("We Communists are
atheists and must unremittingly propagate atheism").
"A Communist Party
member cannot be a religious believer; s/he cannot take part in religious
activities." Id. § IX at 377.
141.
Document 6, supra note 139, § II at 392 ("Party committees and
governments at all levels must . . . instruct the propaganda departments to ...
educate the masses, youngsters in particular, in dialectical materialism and
historical materialism (including atheism)").
142.
Spiegel, supranote 17. Spiegel describes the current state of affairs in
this Communist regime:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never made any secret of its view
of the place of religion within Chinese society. It is to be tolerated-but
only barely-until such time as "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is
fully realized and religion, having become irrelevant, will wither and
die ....
Religious control begins with restricting to five-Buddhism,
Catholicism, Protestantism, Daoism and Islam-the number of religions
officially recognized by the Chinese government, and by separating religion
from "superstition," which is illegal and includes such practices as
divination, fortune telling, healing rituals and exorcising ghosts. Each of
the five recognized religions is monitored by a "patriotic association,"
among them the Chinese Buddhist Association, the Catholic Patriotic
Association, the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), the
Chinese Islamic Association and the Chinese Daoist Association ....
All
churches, temples, mosques, monasteries and other fixed locations for
worship must register with the relevant patriotic association. Unregistered
religious activity is illegal and is a punishable offense ....
Still another constitutional clause outlaws control of any Chinese
congregation by a foreign religious organization. The requirements of selfadministration, self-support and self-propagation (the three-self policy) is
particularly difficult for Catholics, as it severs, as it is meant to, links
between the Vatican and Chinese Catholics ....
January 31, 1994, Regulation No. 144, On the Management of
Religious Activities of Foreigners Within Chinese Borders.
Foreigners
cannot "establish religious organizations, set up religious offices or run
religious institutes." They can only bring in religious material for personal
use-bringing in even one extra Bible is illegal. Foreign pastors must
receive permission, rarely granted, from the RAB to preach in a Chinese
church.
Almost immediately after Regulation No. 144 went into effect, a group
of Protestant missionaries, who reportedly had come to celebrate the
Chinese New Year with fellow-believers, was expelled from China after first
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being detained and harassed. The authorities confiscated from the group a
substantial amount of money and expensive equipment ....
Registration is the government's core control mechanism. Its legal
basis is spelled out in Regulation No. 145, On the Management of Places
for Religious Activities, issued by the Religious Affairs Bureau under the
State Council, and signed by Premier Li Peng on January 31, 1994. A
supplementary set of regulations, Registration Procedures for Religious
Activities, promulgated the following May, details conditions and
procedures for new applicants and formerly approved congregations, all of
which are required to reapply. Registration is based on the "three-fix"
policy, requiring an applicant congregation to have a professional religious
leader approved by the relevant patriotic association, a fixed meeting point
and activities confined to a specific geographic area. Such conditions
effectively eliminate significant contributions by law leaders, critically
important in small congregations and in those, which insist on nonhierarchical organization, and severely proscribes recruitment through
proselytization. In addition, these regulations specify the need for a
regular membership and a legal source of income.
Despite clauses that appear to loosen the ties between religious
personnel and sites and patriotic associations, the latter are charged with
the task of insuring compliance with the rules.
Furthermore, a
government-approved religious affairs administrative commission must
endorse all registration applications, the opinion of the local people's
government or the neighborhood committee must be attached, as well as
the views of unspecified "related parties."
To ensure further control, three of eighteen new articles added by the
National People's Congress on May 12, 1994, to the January 1987
Regulations Governing Public Order Offenses specifically targeted religious
practice. "Carrying out activities under the name of a social organization
without registration," "organizing activities of superstitious sects and
secret societies to disrupt public order" and "disturbing public order and
damaging people's health through religious activities" are subject to
criminal charges. When violations are deemed not serious, perpetrators
can be held for up to 15 days and fined up to 200 yuan ($24). "Disturbing
social order" and "damaging people's health" are not defined in the
Regulations.
"Official" churches too are under constant scrutiny. Controls are
exercised over such issues as personnel selection, sermon themes,
dissemination of religious publications and congregation size. Those that
test the limits of government tolerance, even on matters seemingly outside
the purview of religion are subject to arbitrary procedures including the
forcible removal of leaders, but their members are rarely subjected to the
kind of treatment meted out to "illegal" unofficial groups.
Local authorities use central government regulations to extort money
from unofficial church members, to forcibly break up clandestine meetings,
to hold worshippers without charge until they can raise exorbitant sums to
buy their releases and to orchestrate beatings severe enough to cause
death. In late March 1993, 22 year-old Lai Manping died as the result of a
beating by security forces in Taoyuan Village, Lijia Township, Xunyang
County Shaanxi Province. On January 6, 1994, one day after he was
arrested, Zheng Muzheng, an active proselytizer, was beaten to death in a
jail in Dongkow County, Hunan Province. Thirteen inmates allegedly
administered the beating because Zheng was "disobedient" and "failed to
keep up good cleaning work." When family members finally found out he
had died-12 days later-they rejected that explanation on the grounds
that the wounds were inconsistent with an inmate beating, insisting
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instead that prison authorities had at the very least colluded with the
prisoners. Zheng's widow's lawsuit against a district police station, the
Dogkou Public Security Bureau and three named officers has stalled, and
she herself has been repeatedly interrogated and threatened with arrest.
Other members of unofficial churches have had their personal and
productive property confiscated or been threatened with the loss of their
jobs or been bankrupted by excessive fines. Still others, under constant
surveillance or de facto house arrest, are never formally detained or
arrested. They are held for a few months, released, picked up again,
released again and so on. Some church leaders are intermittently sent on
mandatory journeys in order to disrupt their relationships with their
followers, some are forced to attend long-lasting "study classes" aimed at
conversion to official belief....
In the run up to the fifth anniversary of the 1989 crackdown in
Beijing, six or seven Christians were detained, among them Gao Feng, a
26-year-old worker ....

The others were held only briefly, but Gao was

detained for over a month. Without international intervention, he would
have lost his job. Gao's "crimes" reportedly included links to prodemocracy activists the group had invited to prayer and Bible study
meetings, contacting foreign journalists, issuing an appeal to believers
world wide to help "win the release of our brothers who have been
arrested," planning to pray publicly for the souls of those killed in the 1989
crackdown and complaining about the state of democracy and human
rights in China.
After Gao's release, he was suspended from work and given the
choice of resigning or being fired for absence without leave. Police refused
to provide the company with proof that he had been in detention and, in
fact, denied that he had been held for more than three days ....
On June 18, 1992, forty vehicles loaded with armed police and
government officials broke up a monthly communion service held by the
Jesus Family, an unregistered evangelical Protestant sect, in Duoyigou,
Shandong Province. They arrested participants and destroyed a large part
of the village, including completely or partially bulldozing six buildings.
Sect members were arrested on the spot and again later in the month and
in early July, leaving some children without a parent at home. In what
appeared to be a deliberate attempt to reduce the group's ability to survive
economically, the police also confiscated most of the sect's belongings:
furniture, cotton quilts, cooking and eating utensils. They took away the
long-haired rabbits the group raised, as well as grain and cobblers' tools.
At least 31 of the 61 arrested were sentenced to between one and 12 years
in prison on charges of holding illegal religious gatherings, leading a
.collective life," disturbing the social order, resisting arrest and beating up
police. The latter charge probably referred to the attempt by Jesus Family
members to prevent the razing of their church. The majority of those
detained were sent to Reeducation Through Labor and wound up working
at mining camps. The sect's leader and his sons, arrested a month before
the others, were also charged with "swindling" for collective contributions
to cover the costs of an annual communal Christmas celebration attended
by Jesus Family members, and received the heaviest sentences.
A year later, members who remained free were still being persecuted.
Some had money, bicycles and watches confiscated. On one occasion, the
village was sealed off and anyone wishing to enter or exit had to pay five
yuan. As of August 1994, the church and the site where some members of
the Jesus Family had lived and worked communally were still in ruins.
Meetings of the sect were forbidden, and members were ordered not to
participate in common meals even within a single household. The few who
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Government orchestrated the infiltration, subversion and control
of all organized faiths, particularly Christianity.' 43 By 1958, its
task was completed through the establishment of the Three Self
Patriotic Movement (TSPM) among Protestants, and the Catholic
Patriotic Association (CPA) among Catholics, both of which were
directly controlled by the government's Religious Affairs Bureau,
an agent of the Chinese Communist Party. i 44
During the
Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960's and 70's, however, even
these "official religious associations" were banned, thus forcing all
religious activity underground and giving rise to the modern, but
very illegal house church movement. 145 In 1978, the Communist
government reestablished the TSPM and CPA as a means of
regaining control of the growing number of non-registered house
churches, which by then was reaching the thousands. 14 6 Despite
this government attempt to restrain it, the house church
movement is now believed to be the largest evangelical church in
the world, serving as many as fifty to eighty millio n Chinese
Christians.' 47
The Chinese Government, because it found it
could not officially contain them, continues to persecute,
imprison, torture and even kill these underground church
members as well as other religious believers, including Catholics,
48
Protestants, and Buddhist Tibetans.'
High-ranking Chinese authorities fervently deny that the
underground movement even exists, citing American animosity
49
toward the Chinese as the reason behind the alleged fabrications.'
The evidence, however, points to a different conclusion. A secret
government document titied "Implementation of the Special Class
Struggle for the Suppression of the Christian Churches," which lists
illegal churches known to the government in the Zhejiang province,
was smuggled out of China and is now in the hands of the U.S.
Freedom House. 5 0° In it, the government revealed a plot of mass
church destruction:
"Eliminate, according to law, the illegal

dared to continue to proselytize-primarily
detained and interrogated.

teenagers-were

briefly

Id.
143. Britsch, supra note 136, at 349.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 350.
146. Id.
147. Christian Freedom International, "My Mother, My Dear Mother," at
http://www.christianfreedom.org/frontline/news/Mymothermymother.asp (last visited
Feb. 26,2000).
148. McCormick, supranote 1, at 295.
149.
See CHINA DAILY, supra note 19.
150. The Real Story About China's Christians,The First Freedom (Center for
Religious Freedom, Washington, D.C.), October 1997, at 1, 2.
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religious meeting points. With great determination, suppress illegal
[D]eterminedly suppress and eliminate the large-scale
activities ....
illegal meetings, both Catholic and Protestant."' s ' The document
also details government plans to "list the underground Catholic
bishops, priests and Protestant self-ordained ministers . . . and
implement measures of investigation and indictment."15 2 Despite
the Communist regime's superficial claims that they support
religious freedom, this policy paper demonstrates the true aims of
the Chinese government toward the unofficial and as yet
uncontrolled church by advocating harsh, destructive government
action to uphold the primacy of the state-approved associations.
China does, however, know its enemies well. In regard to
Catholicism, the same paper reads, "The Vatican will try to take
advantage of the normalization of relations between China and
the Vatican to deny the right of independence, sovereignty and
autonomy in the [state-approved] church and work to regain the
Recognizing the
power of the Catholic Church in China."' 5 3
Catholic threat, the paper further revealed that those who refuse
to cooperate within the official religious boundaries and thus fall
be
short of full compliance with the state-approved church5would
4
sentenced to serve time in re-education at labor camps.1
According to U.S. sources, this document mirrors the current
reality of Chinese religious persecution. In 1997, the same year
Beijing announced it would sign the ICCPR, the Washington Post
reported' 5 5 that at least seven Catholic bishops were imprisoned,
forty percent of inmates in Henan labor camps were being
punished for their allegiance to the underground church, four
house church Christians were beaten to death, a Catholic shrine
at Dong-Lu was destroyed, hundreds of house churches had been
and raids and
reported desecrated, shut down or destroyed,
56
arrests were taking place continuously.1
D. Current U.S. DiplomaticEfforts in China
Many U.S. officials take these reports very seriously. In
U.S.
concern,
certain individual cases of international
ambassadors have become personally involved. For example,

151.
152.

Id.
Id.

153.

ASSOCIATED PRESS, Beiing plans breakup of Catholic Church, SOUTH

CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 10, 1999, http://www.scmp.com/News/China/Article/

FullText-aspArticleID-1999110150343300.asp. The article discussed a paper by
the Chinese Communist Party's policy-setting Central Committee. Id.
Id.
154.
155.

WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 9, 1997, at A22.

156.

The Real Story About China's Christians,supra note 150, at 2.
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when Bishop Su disappeared in late 1997, the U.S. ambassador
to China began what continues to be a long-term mission
campaign to determine his whereabouts. 15 7 According to reports,
these diplomatic efforts were soon met by an unresponsive,
uncooperative Chinese authority structure:
When [the Bishop] disappeared, the [U.S.] Embassy immediately
began efforts to ascertain his status and whereabouts, requesting
information from Chinese officials in Beijing and Hebei province.
Chinese officials claimed that the Bishop was free but rejected
embassy requests to see him. Over the next year and one-half,
there were conflicting reports about Bishop Su's status, and the
Embassy continued to press his case. Embassy officers also
regularly raised with Chinese officials the cases of other religious
prisoners and reports of religious persecution... 158
In addition, the Clinton Administration also pled Bishop Su's case
on two very public occasions. The first occurred when President
Clinton secured agreement from President Jiang Zhemin of China
at their October 1997 summit that a delegation of U.S. religious
leaders could travel to China to initiate a dialogue on religious
freedom.' 5 9 In July 1998, Bishop Su's case was again raised
during the President's state visit to China and by Secretary of
160
State Albright in her meetings with senior Chinese officials.
Despite these honorable diplomatic efforts, however, the Bishop
remains a missing person. 1 6 1
While the U.S. Embassies in
several countries have implemented actions in response to

157. Executive Summary, supranote 123.
158. Id. These "other cases" included Pastor Xu Yongze, the boy recognized
by the Dalai Lama as the 1 1th Panchen Lama, Abbot Chadrel Rimpoche, Tibetan
monks and nuns reported to have been beaten in prison, and Pastor Li Dexian.
Id. Embassy efforts have been effective elsewhere, however. See id. In Egypt, for
example, the U.S. Embassy's "expression of interest" led to the release and lifting
of travel restrictions for two Muslim converts to Christianity. Id.
159. In response to the Chinese Government's invitation but wary that the
Chinese may try to "exploit it for propaganda," President Clinton sent an
appointed team of clergymen to China to continue dialogue. CNN Interactive, U.S.
clergymen seek religious dialogue with China (February 11, 1998), http://www.
cnn.com/WORLD/9802/1 1/china.religion/. The team included Roman Catholic
Archbishop Theodore McCarrick, Rabbi Arthur Schneier of New York, and
Reverend Don Argue, President of the National Association of Evangelicals. Id.
Argue noted that "we are willing to take the risk (of being used for propaganda
purposes) to open dialogue and have the opportunity to advance our mission." Id.
The team was involved in meetings prearranged by the Chinese, and were allowed
only to meet with members of state-approved "patriotic" religious organizations.
Id.
160. Executive Summary, supranote 123.
161. Arguably, then, such efforts have done little in regard to promoting the
U.S. goal of international accountability and rescuing the persecuted.
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violations such as formal demarches 16 2 and even sanctions, 16 3 a
glaring lack of any similar action has been taken by the Clinton
Administration with respect to more economically viable countries
64
like China and its strategic counterpart, Russia.1
The presence of the new Commission on International
Religious Freedom has initiated a renewed and more focused
diplomatic effort that promises to yield better results than those
previously obtained.
During the Commission's first year,
Ambassador Seiple and his staff have visited China, Indonesia,
Uzbekistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Laos, Vietnam, Belgium, Austria, Germany, and France' 6" for the
sole purpose of explaining the IRFA's international implications
and promoting religious freedom.
To ease foreign fears of
unilateral U.S. action in their meetings, the Commission
members emphasize the importance of religious liberty in the
American experience but also note that the IRFA relies on
international norms of religious freedom as the standards to
which all countries, including the United States, must be held
accountable. 1 6 6
The Commission has also already made
substantial progress in determining the whereabouts of
prominent religious prisoners like Bishop Su and Catholic priest
16 7
Li Qinghua.

162. Id. The report described embassy efforts in Minsk and Rangoon as
those utilizing formal demarches to raise attention to the human rights concerns
there. Id.
163. Id. "The U.S. Government has supported annual resolutions by U.N.
bodies criticizing Burma's lack of respect for human rights and religious freedom
and has imposed comprehensive sanctions." Id.
164. In fact, the Administration's glowing support of PNTR status for China
demonstrates just the opposite: not only in the U.S. government not utilizing its
sanctioning power against China for its continued human rights abuses, but in
essence is rewarding Chinese persecution with open trade. President Clinton
signed H.R. 4444, the bill granting China PNTR status, into law on Oct. 10, 2000.
For the fact sheet on this signing and other related U.S.-China information, see
The United States and China website from the Department of State International
Information Program at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. During a January 1999 visit to China, Seiple reportedly requested
that an embassy official or an independent third party be permitted to visit Bishop
Su and Father Li. Human Rights Watch World Report 2000, China and Tibet,
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-03 (last visited Sept. 6, 2000). Although to date
the Chinese Government has not responded positively to these requests, it had
expressed willingness to continue discussing and negotiating the matter with the
Ambassador; this dialogue, unfortunately, was suspended in aftermath of the
NATO bombing of the Belgrade-based Chinese embassy in May, 1999. Id.
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V. WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD Do TO PROMOTE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
WITHOUT DAMAGING ITS INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION

"The United States
acknowledges
and accepts its
responsibility to meet [the IRFA's] standards in the safeguarding
and protection of religious liberty." 16 8 In other words, Congress
has decided to unilaterally champion the cause of the human
spirit, and it can voluntarily assume such a burden without
creating a state-endorsed hierarchy of human rights.
Strict
enforcement of legislation that ignores the complex corollary
issues surrounding religious freedom would be largely ineffective
and dangerous. Although unprecedented in this particular area
of human rights, an individual state can, however, voluntarily
and effectively use its power to promote international
acknowledgment of these basic human dignities.
A. Not Hierarchy,But Equality
One of the most popular criticisms of the IRFA is that
through it the United States is discriminating among human
rights. 16 9 In other words, is the United States really setting apart
religious freedom as more important than other human rights,
thus creating the "hierarchy of rights" described by concerned
critics? Absolutely not. While it is certainly true that states
cannot act to protect human rights without recognizing that they
act within the context of an international effort, this does not
necessarily imply that current U.S. actions constitute a statecreated hierarchy at all, let alone one with serious negative
implications for the protection of human rights on an
international level.
It is first significant to note that if anything, religious freedom
until now has been at worst, ignored and at best, neglected as a
legitimate international human rights issue. Despite the clear
affirmation of the free exercise of religion in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has since
issued only a declaration on freedom of religion 170 but not a
covenant on religious liberty, which is substantially less than the
United Nations has done on other major human rights issues

168. Executive Summary, supranote 123.
169. See Wuerffel, supranote 41, at 392.
170.
United Nations Declarationon the Eliminationof All Forms of Intolerance
and of DiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
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1 72
and
such as the covenants on race 1 7 1 and the rights of women
1 73
Yet despite this glaring irregularity, the present
children.
legislative campaign against religious persecution is being called
"special pleading" in foreign policy circles and is criticized
domestically for creating a hierarchy of rights that would
downgrade political and racial persecution. Despite charges of
favoritism coming at them from all sides, those in charge of the
refinement and implementation of religious freedom foresee that
there is little chance that a sufficient number of nations would
that would
ever ratify a treaty or covenant on religious freedom
74
eventually become customary international law. 1

These criticisms are both strange and misplaced. First, the
problem remains that the only real international consensus
concerning human rights lies in the language of the Declaration.
Perhaps, such legislation as the IRFA, if drafted and adopted by
the United Nations itself as a means of addressing the problem of
international religious persecution rather than by the United
States, would properly be cited as discriminating among rights
and thus undermining the spirit of the Declaration. Second, all
human rights campaigns are "particular pleadings" for foreign
policy purposes, as they tend to focus on specific causes. The
United States has several task forces on various human rights
issues. From gender to race, it seems that many human rights
have already reserved a special place in U.S. foreign policy. For
example, Human Rights Watch has special initiatives in place on
Amnesty International focuses on
drugs and human rights.
prisoners of conscience and the death penalty on an international
When Secretary of State Madeline Albright recently
level.
expanded international labor rights coverage, there was no
similar outcry that the United States was overstepping its
175
boundaries.
The United States need not be penalized for taking advantage
of its position as a global leader to promote change in all areas of
As
human rights abuses, including religious persecution.
awareness of atrocities increases, "religious human rights deserve
more than to remain a neglected chapter in the universal

171. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signatureMar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
172. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar.
31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
173. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989).
174. Robert F. Drinan, S.J., The Convergence of the First Amendment and
Vatican II on Religious Freedom, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1948, 1950 (1999).
175. Marshall, supranote 28.
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endeavors6 to ensure observance of and respect for human
17
rights."
Inserting freedom of religion into the mix does not set it
higher than these other rights. On the contrary, its inclusion
assures that the United States will take a more comprehensive
approach to international human rights leadership and policy. As
explained by Shattuck:
"There will be no sponsorship or
endorsement of any religion or of, indeed, religion as such. The
United States... is [simply] looking at an issue of basic human
rights, very similar to other human rights areas that we have
looked at."17 7 Because that is all the United States is seeking to
do, it should be supported rather than reprimanded for its effort
thus far.
B. Appropriate U.S. Enforcement of the IRFA
Assuming its involvement is legitimate, then, how should the
United States enforce the provisions of the IRFA, if at all? In the
recent past, the Clinton Administration appears only to have been
paying lip service to the Act's most serious provisions. On
Religious Freedom Day in 1997, President Clinton stated:
"America's commitment to religious tolerance has empowered us
to achieve an atmosphere of understanding, trust, and respect in
a society of diverse cultures and religious traditions. Today,
much of the world still looks to the United States as the
champion of religious liberty." 178 Unfortunately, these superficial
political claims accomplish little in the face of continuing
persecution such as arrests, beatings and floggings, starvation,
slavery, imprisonment, amputation, beheading, hanging and
executions.179

China is a perfect example, however, of why a very strict
enforcement of the IRFA which matches "this" violation to "that"
corresponding penalty would likely be a harsh and ill-advised
move on the part of the United States. The U.S. government
would have a hard enough time enforcing it domestically, let
alone on a worldwide scale, even though mistakes could be more
easily corrected and outliers brought to heel within the States. In
176.

Nathan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in

RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79,

134

(Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (emphasis added).
177.
On-the-Record Briefing by John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, On Report on "U.S. Policies in Support
of Religious Freedom: Focus on Christians," Washington, D.C., July 22, 1997,
http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/970722. shattuck.html.
178.
Shattuck, supranote 59.
179. McCormick, supra note 1, at 320.
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contrast, foreign relations law by definition involves the presence
of third parties 180 who are not within our direct control and are
thus almost impossible to oversee. 18 1
In addition to the
aforementioned enforcement problems for individual nation
offenders, there is also evolving in the present age a much greater
obstacle to the IRFA: a secularism that so permeates Western
culture that many will begin to deny that the free exercise of
18 2
religion is a value that deserves any particular attention at all.
So how can the United States implement the spirit and
purpose of the IRFA on an international scale without running
headfirst into these problems? Since 1997, efforts of the United
States to incorporate religious freedom into foreign policy have
83
been focused almost exclusively at a formal diplomatic level.'
According to State Department documents, public U.S. actions
concerning religious freedom currently include the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The President and Secretary have publicly instructed all U.S.
agencies and embassies to treat religious freedom as a
priority issue;
U.S. Government officials at all levels have raised religious
freedom issues with foreign leaders and representatives in
meetings;
The Secretary has instructed all U.S. diplomatic posts to
treat religious freedom as a priority;
The State Department annually reports on the worldwide
status of religious freedom in a special section of its Human
Rights Report;

180. "Third parties" in this context refers to other nation-states.
181. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism,70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223
(1999). Sensing this problem, Spiro takes a quite different approach: he explores
whether individual U.S. states---insofar as they are recognized as autonomous
players in global politics within their independent spheres of authority.., and are
subject to the discipline of a globalized international economy"-should be allowed
to develop their own foreign policy as it suits them so long as their subfederal
action does not disrupt national foreign relations. Id. at 1225, 1247.
182. Dinan, supra note 173, at 1955.
183. Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Remarks before Public Meeting
of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad, Washington,
D.C., Feb. 13, 1997, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/970213acrfa-mtgsumm.html.
As Albright has emphatically stated: "The issue of
religious freedom belongs squarely in any comprehensive discussions that we
should be having and are having about American foreign policy." Id. Since the
official passage of H.R. 4444 on October 10, 2000, non-economic diplomatic efforts
perhaps may be the sole option available to the U.S. government officials. In
passing H.R. 4444, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected (83-15) an amendment
that would have conditioned PNTR on Chinese improvement in human rights,
thus effectively removing the use of trade privileges as leverage in the human
rights debate. See U.S. Dept. of State website, InternationalInformation Programs
at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina.
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(9)
(10)
(11)

(12)
(13)
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The President, Vice-President and Secretary have met with
international religious leaders such as the Pope and the
18 4
Dalai Lama;
The President and Secretary have created what is now known
as the Commission on International Religious Freedom;
The U.S. Government has utilized "multilateral fora to speak
forcefully and shape international policy in support of
religious freedom and in response to violations;"
The Administration has appropriated funds from the foreign
assistance budget to support religious liberty and tolerance
programs;
The Administration has supported "religious reconciliation
and interfaith cooperation" in war-torn nations;
The Administration broadcasts internationally programs
advocating religious freedom;
The Administration promotes "Model Business Principles
among U.S. businesses to underscore that human rights and
religious freedom, on the one hand, and economic
development on the other, are complementary, not
contradictory, and that a good human rights environment
185
supports and promotes a good business environment."
The Administration "applaud[s] the critical efforts of . . .
religious groups in shining a spotlight on abuses wherever
they occur;" and
President Clinton's asylum initiatives grant special
consideration to those seeking refuge from religious
18 6
persecution.

Is this enough, or is it even the proper approach to effectuating
the IRFA? Many critics of current U.S. policy argue that China's
horrifying record of religious and human rights should not have
merited greater economic rewards in the form of more trade
rights, especially admittance to the WTO. They claim that the
more the human right situation deteriorates in China, the last

184. In response to an accusation that the United States was basically
paying lip-service to religious rights while really doing nothing to effectively
combat persecution, Shattuck gave the following response:
Q--"A number of your critics would say a report is all well and good, but
this Administration's actions have been sort of tepid notwithstanding your
...
points. For example, the President did meet with the Dalai Lama, but
it was a drop-by; it wasn't an official visit. He hasn't really pressed those
kinds of things. .

...

" A-Well, I think there has been no Administration

that has focused more on this topic than the Clinton Administration. The
new emphasis that it's receiving in the second administration and the fact
that the President, this President, the Secretary of State are meeting with
religious leaders such as the Dalai Lama is one element of that focus."
Shattuck, supra note 59.
185. Shattuck, supra note 59. In 1997, the State Department awarded
John Kamm, the President of Asia Pacific Resources, with the Best Global
Practices Award for his company's "efforts to obtain the release of individuals
detained and imprisoned by Chinese authorities for exercising their right to free
expression and freedom of religion." Id.
186. Id.
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and worst thing the United States should have supported is a
8 7
decision that gives China such vast economic rewards.1
Noting the most recent U.S. State Department Human Rights
Report, foreign policy analyst Darren Logan is one of those critics.
He argued that the United States must wait until reform is visible
in China before seriously considering supporting China's bid to
join the WTO. 1 8 8
Bill Saunders, human rights counsel for a
domestic politico-religious organization, observed:
The Chinese government is increasingly guilty of religious
persecution, forced abortions, and victimization of political
dissidents and ethnic minorities-so why would we reward the
government with economic security and open trading? If we give
China membership in to the WTO, we lose future leverage in
fighting injustice in China and we effectively undermine the cause
of democracy and freedom around the world. 18 9
These are legitimate concerns and have been echoed in the recent
legislative
debates
on
issues
involving
trade
rights,
nonproliferation treaties, and religious freedoms. 190
Although
many feel that the best U.S. approach to effectuating the IRFA
would be to keep open trade relations with China (called a
"constructive engagement" 19 1 approach), others emphatically
disagree. Clinton's policy of toleration and engagement when it
comes to China and the annual approval of "normal trade
relations" status have indeed not remedied the incidents of
persecution.
On the contrary, arguably such a hands-off
approach has only moved China closer to absolute despotism.
Why is that?
"Engaging" China has been ineffective because
China is vast, isolated, and quite able to hide its abuses. To
effectively address the Chinese human rights situation, critics
claim the United States must adopt a more assertive strategy
than simple engagement. Otherwise, the Chinese government will

187. Press Release, Family Research Council, China's Record of Wrongs
Should Not Merit More Trade Rights (Nov. 18, 1999) (on file with the Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law). Unfortunately, despite heated Congressional
debate over the role played by human rights issues in the PNTR decision, the
Senate heard and rejected those amendments that would have joined the two
issues. To view transcripts of these recent debates, see http://usinfo.state.gov/
regional/ea/uschina.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Most of the recent debates have revolved around H.R. 4444, a bill that
would grant China PNTR status. U.S. Dept. of State website, U.S. official Policy
Materials on
U.S.-China
Relations,
http://lists.state.gov/archives/USChina.html.
191. The general belief of constructive engagement is that the more the
United States engages in trade, the more America is able to export First
Amendment ideals along with the goods. McCormick, supra note 1, at 297.
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simply continue to ignore U.S. and internationally-held human
192
rights concerns.
The immediate response many of these critics support is to
193
impose the sanctions that are provided for in the IRFA.
Recently, the United States has effectively used sanctions and
executive orders in response to India and Pakistan's violations of
the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994194 and to
retaliate against the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro for
continuing to repress ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 195 In response
to Castro's persecution of the Cuban community, the United
States has now maintained a trade embargo against Cuba for
1 96
forty years to pressure Castro to improve his policies.
Despite the above successes, an underlying level of fear still
pervades the Administration's feeble confrontation efforts thus far
in the Far East.
China is one of the greatest suppliers of
dangerous weapons to America's sworn enemies and is currently

192. Id. In fact, China will now have no economic incentive to do so. The
United States has now-through the passage of PNTR for China-made it nearly
impossible to utilize trade leverage to encourage Chinese reform in the area of
religious human rights.
193.
See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State website, supra note 189.
U.S.
Representative Chris Smith is one of Congress' most outspoken advocates on this
issue, arguing that Clinton's strategy of constructive engagement has "brought the
people of China 6 more years of torture, forced labor, forced abortion, and
sterilization, the crushing of the free trade unions, the denial of fundamental
rights of freedom of religion, of expression, of assembly, and of the press ....
When the U.S. turns up the economic pressure of Beijing, the beatings and the
torture are less severe and are imposed on fewer people. When the pressure lets
up, the repression gets worse." Rep. Chris Smith Decries Persecutionin China, July
19, 2000, at Dept. of State website, supra note 189.
194. William M. McGlone & Timothy P. Trenkle, Economic Sanctions and
Export Controls, 33 INTL LAW. 257, 258 (1999). The authors stated:
In response to a series of nuclear weapons tests by India and then
Pakistan in May, President Clinton imposed statutorily-mandated
sanctions under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (NPPA)
... [which] mandates a menu of sanctions against any 'non-nuclear' state
that 'detonate[s] a nuclear explosive device . . . . Almost immediately
following India's surprise nuclear tests, President Clinton issued a
determination that India had 'detonated a nuclear explosive device on May
11, 1998,' and he directed the relevant government agencies to impose
sanctions under the NPPA. The President issued a similar determination
with respect to Pakistan shortly after its detonation of a nuclear device on
May 28, 1998.
Id.
195. Id. at 261. The executive order blocked Yugoslavian property and
prohibited new investment in Serbia, paralleling European Union's investment
ban on Yugoslavia. Id.
196. Foreign Policy: Governor George Ryan of illinois Visits Cuba, Current
Focus on American Government, http://www/currentlinks.org/featuredcurrent/
index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2000).
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conducting the world's largest build-up of arms.
These
destructive activities are indirectly supported by the growing U.S.
trade deficit with China, which presently is in excess of fifty
billion dollars and is expected to grow to more than sixty billion in
1999.197 China's goal is to be just as powerful, if not more so,
than the United States. 198
Perhaps it is well on its way,
especially
considering
its
recent
military
and
political
partnerships with Russia. 19 9 Meanwhile, as the United States
weakly engages, Chinese abuses grow in
frequency and
strength.2 0 0 They want the United States to stay out of what they
20 1
consider to be solely internal concerns.
Despite logical reservations about the effectiveness of any
particular remedy for China's violations of religious freedom,
some kind of action must occur in response to such open hostility
to human life and dignity irregardless of any purely economic
concerns the United States might have. As Ambassador Seiple
noted, "you have a human right that's universal and that

197. Morality in Foreign Policy, Frequently Asked Questions section of the
Family Research Council website, at http://www.frc.org/faq/faq9.html (last
visited Sept. 8, 2000).
198. Jim Garamone, DOD Report Examines China's Military Goals, AMERICAN
FoRCES PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 3, 1998. China currently holds classified design
information on American nuclear warleads and guidance technologies and has
nurtured a budding relationship with Russia since the U.S. Serbian raids. Id. A
1999 Pentagon report states that China's ultimate goal is "parity in economic,
political and military strength with the world's leading powers by the middle of the
next century," so it is not surprising that the corroboration of the two powers
would be of concern to the U.S. Administration. Saunders, supra note 24.
William Saunders is foreign policy and human rights counsel to the Family
Research Council. Id.
199. Colonel Robert Maginnis, 1999 Update on Chinese Security Threat,
Military Readiness Project, Family Research Council website, http://www.frc.
gov/mil/mp99gldf.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) (on file with Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law). China and Russia are a dangerous combination:
both countries perceive the U.S. as an enemy, and currently perform simulated
missile firings against U.S. troops in South Korea, Okinawa and mainland Japan;
China also regularly visits Russian Pacific Fleet exercises to train against U.S.
attacks on the Russian coastline. In the words of Russia's Security Council and
federal security service director Vladimir Putin: "In the light of the rapidly
changing situation in the world, relations between Russia and China have
assumed strategic nature." 990609 China/Russia, STATFOR NEWS ARCHIVE: China,

June 9, 1999. See id. Maginnis is Family Research Council's senior director,
national security and foreign affairs. Id.
200. Rep. Chris Smith Decries Persecutionin China, supra note 193.
201. The Xinhua News Agency published a statement asserting that the
United States "persists in playing power politics" even though "religious affairs
should not be interfered with by other countries'; "[tihe United States has no right
to criticize China's religious affairs, and the act of imposing sanctions against
China according to U.S. domestic law is a violation of international laws.' Xinhua
General News Service, December 11, 1999 (on file with Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law).
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transcends nation-state, that transcends borders. You have this
concept of neutral accountability in the international covenants
that China has signed." 20 2 Many foreign skeptics will also be
watching the U.S. response to Chinese atrocities, seeing if we take
this opportunity to go easy on our economic allies while bullying
militarily and economically weaker countries, for example,
punishing Sudan while Saudi Arabia, Israel and China get
20 3
nothing more than a slap on the wrist.

C. The IRFA Not as Mere Legislation,But as Mobilizing Declaration

Considering the above, the IRFA's strongest use may be as a
mobilizing declaration of intent. Just as the United Nations
declared its commitments over fifty years ago, so now does the
United States individually declare its own allegiance to the cause
of human dignity. Strong diplomatic foreign policy at all levels of
government is perhaps the most important and influential means
available to America to effectively pressure other regimes to
comply with human rights standards. 20 4 If utilized properly, the
IRFA can add strength and support to various grassroots and
non-governmental entities already acting to champion the cause
of religious freedom, as it has done already.
Several alternatives to strict official enforcement, such as
involvement of secular and religious organizations, letter-writing
campaigns, etc., find support in the IRFA's language of
responsibility and cooperation. These foreign policy tools include
public and private diplomacy, several forms of aid, 20 5 or trade
sanctions such as tariffs, quotas, "normal trade relations" status,
direct-investment controls, limits on transfer of technology,
boycotts and embargoes. 20 6 Positive changes within the United
States can promote change internationally as well. Examples
include restrictions on benefits from international financial
institutions, indoctrination via dissemination of information over
the Internet, internal business practices, and the granting of
asylum to persecuted individuals. 20 7

202. Seiple, supranote 117.
203.
Lieblich, supra note 132 (quoting Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Emory
University law professor).
204.
McCormick, supra note 1, at 315-16.
205. This includes humanitarian, economic, infrastructure and military aid.
206. Through international organizations such as the United Nations, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the International Courts
of Justice or through treaties such as GATT, NAFTA, Maastricht, or NATO, the
U.S. can also influence the remedial decisions of offending nations. Id. at 316.
207. Id. at 316-17.
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Some suggest that a more individualized grassroots approach
would be the most effective approach. Several political and nonpolitical groups have already taken this suggestion to heart. The
Religious Prisoners Task Force, for example, is run by a small
contingent of bipartisan Congressmen and organizes letter-writing
20 8
campaigns on behalf of international religious prisoners.
Christian Freedom International frequently advocates similar
letter-writing to its website visitors. 20 9 Many in the international
legal community also endorse a voluntary fund sponsored by
several U.N. member nations which would establish within the
United Nations itself an enforcement body much like the current
U.S. Commission, but with the neutrality that other U.N. member
2 10
nations feel is lacking in a unilateral U.S. effort.
Above all else, the United States needs to act decisively
according to the commands of the IRFA to combat the religious
persecution that is increasingly prevalent in many areas of the
world.
In order to avoid overstepping their boundaries as a
member as opposed to a preeminent self-proclaimed despotic
leader of the international community, it should also seek
international consensus on the definitions contained in the IRFA.
In regard to the appropriateness of sanctions, because
"lesser" forms of persecution do not dangerously threaten the
lives or livelihoods of religious minorities and are often incidental
by-products of a foreign nation's establishment of religion, 2 1 1 the
United States should hesitate to utilize sanctions in those cases.
Otherwise, it runs the risk of becoming a sort of "moral police" for

208. OKeefe, supranote 31.
209. Persecuted Christiansin the People's Republic of China, supra note 15.
Efforts such as these demonstrate that this advocacy work should not simply be
left to secular human rights organizations, arguing that although objectivity is
required to take a rational and neutral approach to combating violations, secular
organizations are often insensitive toward such persecution. Johan van der Vyver
disagrees, however, saying that even those nations who establish a national
religion necessarily violate religious human rights: "[T]he human rights paradigm
is concerned with protecting the minority against the majority .

.

.

.

States

upholding a particular religious commitment often claim to be tolerant toward
other religions, but the notion of toleration in itself reflects a condescending
attitude." An-Na'im, supranote 49, at 987.
210. An-Na'im, supra note 49, at 980. Although it would seem an "incredibly
complicated task to get some 185 countries around the world, with their own
religious and cultural traditions, to come together and collaborate in applying this
universal concept [of religious freedom] in their respective situations," this idea is
gathering followers. Id.
211. Johan van der Vyver disagrees, saying that even those nations who
establish a national religion necessarily violate religious human rights: "[Tihe
human rights paradigm is concerned with protecting the minority against the
majority ....
States upholding a particular religious commitment often claim to
be tolerant toward other religions, but the notion of toleration in itself reflects a
condescending attitude." Id. at 987.
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the world. If it did so, the United States would be attempting to
recreate the world into its own image, proclaiming its beliefs to be
the best, as well as the only, standard by which the rest of the
world must abide. That it must not do. The United States is not
the only member of the international community, but is merely a
participant, albeit an influential and powerful one. It should act
and support from the rest of
like one in order to gain acceptance
2 12
the international community.
The United States should confine its serious official actions
such as sanctions to counter only the worst instances of
persecution which fall into the "severe violations" category of the
IRFA as it is amended to reflect international, rather than simply
nationalistic, concerns. In response to such severe violations,
however, the Administration should not hesitate to act swiftly and
harshly. People of faith are dying every day, and the United
States can and should use its power and influence to help
preserve human dignity around the globe.
D. Conclusion
Ambassador Seiple asserted, "We should never apologize for
human rights being part of our foreign policy, part of our national
2 13
interest, and being on the table in any bilateral relationship."
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 should not be
used as a purely punitive instrument. Instead, it should be
envisioned and utilized as an international act with international
implications, on an equal basis with economic and trade
concerns. Instead of tabling such life and death issues to focus
on economic questions and thus choosing money over morals, the
United States should have incorporated its concerns about
China's human rights abuses when it determined whether to
Now that such an
support China's admission to the WTO.
opportunity has passed, the United States should investigate
other means to fervently seek significant worldwide consensus on
the need to promote religious human rights just as it has in the
past taken the lead in advocating women's, children's and racebased rights. By doing so, it will bring religious freedom to the
same level as these other important human rights and will take a
stand for Bishop Su, his comrades, and for human dignity not
only in China, but throughout the globe.

212. Id. at 1017-18. Comments of Rosalind Hackett: "The need for the
widest possible consensus is not inherent in the nature of the human rights
paradigm as a collaborative global effort, it is a prerequisite for the effective
implementation of these standards." Id.
213. Seiple, supra note 117.
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Harold Hongju Koh, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor perhaps said it best.
"When we promote religious freedom, we promote all human
2 14
rights."
Nichol Jeannette Starr

214.
From Assistant Secretary Koh's comments at a special State
Department briefing in September, 1999. Radio Free Europe, World: Religious
Freedom Lacking Around Globe, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/
09.F.RU.990910125436.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2000).

